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The law of England and Wales1 relating to the liability of an occupier of land in 
negligence2 to a person who comes on to that land is today largely found in the 
Occupiers’ Liability Acts 1957 and 1984, rather than the common law. 
 
The stories behind the enactment of these two pieces of legislation are related but 
distinct.  The Occupiers’ Liability Act 1957 placed the negligence liability of an occupier 
to a lawful visitor on an equivalent basis to that reached by the common law of 
negligence following Donoghue v Stevenson,3 although encompassing liability for 
omissions, and with liability essentially based on the reasonable foreseeability of physical 
harm.  A number of more restrictive rules found in the common law of occupiers’ liability 
to lawful entrants, which had been endorsed by the House of Lords, were removed.  At 
that time, the House of Lords was bound by its own previous decisions and the law could 
only be remodelled by legislation.  The 1957 Act was based on a report by the Law 
Reform Committee.4  After the House of Lords gave itself the power to depart from its 
                                           
1 The law of occupiers’ liability in Scotland and Northern Ireland is found in the 
Occupier’s Liability (Scotland) Act 1960, the Occupiers’ Liability Act (NI) 1957 and the 
Occupiers’ Liability (Northern Ireland) Order 1987, SI 1987/1280 (NI 15). 
2 An occupier may be liable to an entrant on other legal bases, such as trespass to the 
person or under the Defective Premises Act 1972, s.4, but not in private nuisance (there 
has to be an interference with land in which the claimant has an interest: Hunter v 
Canary Wharf [1997] AC 655) or under Rylands v Fletcher (1868) LR 3 HL 330 (there 
has to be an escape: Read v J Lyons & Co Ltd [1947] AC 156). 
3 [1932] AC 562. 
4 See n 128. 
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own previous decision where that was in the interests of justice to do so,5 the House in 
British Railways Board v Herrington6 in effect exercised that power to depart from its 
decision in Addie & Sons Ltd v Dumbreck7 that had held that an occupier was not liable 
to a trespasser in negligence, but only for acts (and only possibly omissions) that 
intentionally or recklessly endangered the trespasser.  The House in Herrington sought 
to set a standard of liability somewhere between the old rule and the negligence 
standard applicable to lawful visitors, albeit nearer to the latter than the former.  There 
was some dissatisfaction with the detail of the principles articulated, the matter was the 
subject of a report by the Law Commission8 and that in turn led to the enactment of the 
1984 Act (in somewhat different terms from those recommended by the Law 
Commission).  
 
Since their enactment, the two Acts have been the subject of some amendment, in the 
light of particular developments, but their essential structure has remained.  They seem 
to have worked well, and there is no current pressure for change.  However, there are a 
number of points that remain awkward and have not been resolved. These include the 
exact relationship between these Acts and the common law; the proper solution to the 
question as to the extent of any liability that should arise where an entrant to land 
encounters a hazard that is obvious to him or her and/or to a reasonable person; and 
the extent to which liability to an entrant other than a lawful visitor can be excluded by 
the occupier.  It is tempting to regard the expansion of occupiers’ liability law enshrined 
in the two Acts as simply a victory in the inexorable onward march of the law of 
negligence that would in time have been achieved by the judges themselves without the 
need for legislative intervention.9  However, it is submitted that the position is not as 
simple as that.  It must be remembered that what makes the law of occupiers’ liability 
                                           
5 Practice Statement (HL: Judicial Precedent) [1966] 1 WLR 1234.  
6 [1972] AC 877. 
7 [1929] AC 358.  
8 See n 236. 
9 As turned out to be the case in Australia by virtue of the decision of the High Court of 
Australia in Australian Safeway Stores Pty Ltd v Zaluzna (1987) 162 CLR 479. 
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special is the fact that liability can be imposed for an omission to make premises 
reasonably safe for an entrant, and not merely for the negligent creation by the occupier 
of a risk.  It is well recognised that the common law has been cautious about the 
imposition of duties of affirmative action through the tort of negligence.10  As we shall 
see, some of the difficulties in the development of the common law in this area were 
essentially genuine difficulties in determining how far it was appropriate to impose 
liability for an omission, in a way that made sense alongside other branches of what 
came to be the tort of negligence.11  
 
This essay will consider the common law of occupier’s liability and then the two Acts in 
turn.12 
 
II Occupiers’ Liability at Common Law 
 
The common law concerning the liability of an occupier to a visitor was both obscure in 
its historical origins and complex in the structure of rules that ultimately emerged.  In 
the nineteenth century, there was no organising concept of ‘occupiers’ liability’.  As to 
the historical origins, cases involving liability for harm caused to entrants to land by 
careless acts or by structural defects were to be found within the amorphous mass of 
actions on the case.  Some textbook treatments considered the area as part of the law of 
nuisance, some as part of the law of negligence, others as a separate area.13  Cases 
                                           
10 See Stovin v Wise [1996] AC 923, per Lord Hoffmann at 943-944; cf Willes J in 
Gautret v Egerton (1867) LR 2 CP 371, 375:  “No action will lie against a spiteful man 
who, seeing another running into a position of danger, merely omits to warn him.” 
11 The significance of this aspect was emphasised by FH Bohlen, Studies in the Law of 
Torts (Indeanapolis, The Bobbs-Merrill Co, 1926) Chaps 2, 3 and 6. See also HK Lücke, 
‘Towards a general theory of negligence and occupiers’ liability’ (1959-60) 2 Melb ULR 
472. 
12 The leading treatment is PM North, Occupiers’ Liability (London, Butterworths, 1971). 
This takes the story up to the decision of the Court of Appeal in Herrington. For a 
discussion of the historical origins, see NS Marsh, ‘The history and comparative law of 
invitees, licensees and trespassers’ (1953) 69 LQR 182 and 359. A second edition of 
North’s book was published by OUP in 2014. 
13 See respectively, CG Addison, Treatise on the Law of Torts (New York, Cockroft & Co, 
1878) pp 253, 281; WE Gordon and WH Griffith, Addison on Torts, 8th edn (London, 
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tended to be determined by applying or distinguishing precedents on their facts rather 
than by reference to principles or arguments of policy, although some glimpses of the 
latter could be seen at least in novel cases.14 
 
 A The mid-nineteenth century cases 
 
 A number of propositions emerged during the course of the nineteenth century.15  First, 
it was established that it was unlawful for a landowner to set a spring gun without giving 
notice, the absence of which demonstrated that the purpose was to injure and not to 
deter.16  This operated as an exception to the general principle that landowners could 
make what use of their land they chose provided that did not interfere with the rights of 
others.17  The nineteenth century cases tended to raise the question of how far 
landowners were entitled to go in creating dangers to deter trespassers; the idea that 
                                                                                                                                   
Stevens and Sons, 1906) pp 717-724; F Pollock, The Law of Torts, 4th edn (London, 
Stevens and Sons, 1886) Ch XII (duties of insuring safety). 
14 See eg Priestley v Fowler (1837) 3 M & W 1, a decision which paved the way for the 
controversial doctrine of common employment.  The Court of Exchequer held that a 
master did not owe a servant a duty to use proper care to ensure that a van in which the 
latter was carried was in a proper state of repair and not overloaded. Lord Abinger CB 
stated (at p.5) that ‘It is admitted that there is no precedent for the present action by a 
servant against a master.  We are therefore to decide the question upon general 
principles, and in doing so we are at liberty to look at the consequences of a decision the 
one way or the other.’  To impose liability here ‘will be found to carry us to an alarming 
extent.’  See discussion by MA Stein, ‘Victorian tort liability for workplace injuries’ (2008) 
University of Illinois Law Review 933. 
15 On the development of the law of negligence in the nineteenth century, see DJ 
Ibbetson, A historical introduction to the law of obligations (Oxford, OUP, 1999), pp169-
187; and DJ Ibbetson, ‘The tort of negligence in the common law in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries’ in EJH Schrage, Negligence: The comparative legal history of the law 
of torts (Berlin, Duncker & Humblot, 2001), pp 229-271. 
16 Bird v Holbrook (1828) 1 Moo & P 607. CB, aged 17, entered a walled garden, in order 
to get back a peahen that had strayed, and was seriously injured in the leg by a spring 
gun of which no notice had been given.  H had asked a third party not to mention that 
the gun was set ‘lest the villains should not be detected.’  Cf Ilott v Wilkes (1820) 3 B & 
Ald 304 (no action for damages where notice was given that there were spring guns in a 
wood; volenti defence applied). 
17 See Dallas J in Deane v Clayton (1817) 7 Taunt 489, 522:  ‘[W]ithin the limit of my 
own property adjoining a common….I may dig a ditch, however, wide; and man or beast 
sustaining harm, having no right to be there, no action will lie.’ Citing Blithe v Topham, 
Cro Ja 158); cf Park J at 513, noting that in Blithe v Topham ‘it was not found that the 
pit was dug for the purpose of killing mares.’ 
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they might be required to take any affirmative steps to protect trespassers was 
rejected.18 
 
Secondly, a very different view was taken where a landowner allowed a person to enter 
their land for some purpose of benefit to the landowner.  In Parnaby v Lancaster Canal 
Co19 the Court of Exchequer Chamber held that the owners of a canal, taking tolls for the 
navigation, were bound to use reasonable care in making the navigation secure, here by 
removing or giving warning of a sunken barge.  Tindal CJ stated20 that this liability was 
based 
 upon a similar principle to that which makes a shopkeeper, who invites the 
 public to his shop, liable for neglect on leaving a trap door open without any 
 protection, by which his customers suffer injury. 
 
No cases were cited to support the latter proposition.  The underlying ideas were not 
articulated. (In modern terms they might be that the benefit to the landowner in itself 
created a special relationship with the entrant that justified imposition of a duty of care 
to take affirmative steps to protect him or her or that the positive invitation in the 
circumstances entitled the entrant reasonably to assume that care had been taken by 
the landowner.21)  There was an obvious analogy with the law of contract but no 
suggestion that the liability of either canal company or shopkeeper was so based.  
                                           
18 Hounsell v Smyth (1860) 7 CB (NS) 732 (plaintiff fell into excavations on waste land 
between two public highways; no liability). (No case raised the question whether a 
landowner who took over land with a spring gun already in place might come under a 
duty to remove it or to give notice; presumably the answer would have been yes.)   
There could, however, be liability in public nuisance where an excavation adjoining the 
highway rendered use of the highway dangerous; the defendant was not allowed to 
argue that a plaintiff who fell into the excavation was technically a trespasser:  Barnes v 
Ward (1850) 9 CB 392; cf Hardcastle v South Yorkshire Railway Co (1859) 4 H & N 67. 
19 (1839) 11 A & E 223. Applied by the House of Lords in Mersey Docks and Harbour 
Board Trustees v Gibbs (1866) LR 1 HL 93 to a public body. 
20 At 243. 
21 See Stovin v Wise, n10. As to the second justification, see Pigot CB in Sullivan v 
Waters (1864) 14 ICLR 460 at 467, where he stated that claims by an entrant ‘who is 
induced by the owner to come to his premises for the purposes of business carried on by 
the owner there’ were different from those by a person who has a ‘mere licence’ . cf 
Cockburn CJ in Corby v Hill, below n 31.  
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Subsequent decisions imposed a similar general duty of affirmative action on 
shopkeepers and the like as regards customers;22 on railway companies as regards 
passengers;23 and on the proprietor of a market who received tolls.24 In 1864 Cockburn 
CJ said that it was 
 now settled law that any one inviting the public to a given place for purposes of 
 business is bound to take reasonable care that the place in question can be 
 entered with safety.25  
 
However, liability would not be imposed where the entrant encountered an obvious risk, 
although whether by reference to a limitation on the duty or the establishment of a 
defence of contributory negligence or volenti non fit injuria was not necessarily made 
clear.26 
 
Thirdly, a middle way emerged in the case of a person who entered land with the 
permission of but no benefit to the landowner.  It was held in Southcote v Stanley27 that 
a claim by an ordinary visitor to premises that he was injured when a piece of glass fell 
from a door and that the occupier had been careless in that regard disclosed no cause of 
action.  Pollock CB28 held that as a master would not be liable to a servant in such 
                                           
22 Chapman v Rothwell (1858) El Bl & Bl 168 (deceased visiting brewery office on 
business fell through open trap door in passage). 
23 Grote v Chester and Holyhead Railway Co (1848) 2 Ex 250 (defendant liable for injury 
to passenger of a different railway company caused by a defective brake); Martin v 
Great Northern Railway Co (1855) 16 CB 179.  A railway company owed a duty of care 
to a passenger in tort; it was not necessary to establish a contractual relationship:  
Marshall v York, Newcastle and Berwick Railway Co (1851) 11 CB 655 (claim for loss of 
baggage by servant whose ticket was paid for by his master). 
24 Lax and Bainbridge v Mayor of Darlington (1878) 5 Ex D 28. 
25 Hodgman v West Midland Railway Co (1864) 5 B & S 173, 191. 
26 See Wilkinson v Fairrie (1862) 1 H & C 633 (workman on business at sugar refiners 
warehouse was directed down a dark passage and fell down an unlit staircase;  nonsuit 
by Bramwell B on the basis that ‘if he could see his way, the accident was the result of 
his own negligence, if he could not see his way, he ought not to have proceeded without 
a light’ upheld on appeal;  Toomey v London, Brighton and South Coast Railway Co 
(1857) 3 CB (NS) 145 (illiterate passenger looking for urinals opened wrong door and fell 
down some steps). 
27 (1856) 1 H & N 247. 
28 With whom Alderson B agreed. 
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circumstances,29 a visitor could not be in a better position.  Bramwell B30 stated that 
there might be liability for an act of commission, as where a person asked another to 
walk in his garden in which he had placed spring guns or man-traps, and the latter was 
not warned and was thereby injured.  However, no ‘act of commission’ was alleged here.   
 
That there might be liability for negligently creating a risk of harm was subsequently 
confirmed in Corby v Hill,31 where the defendant, a builder, was held liable for carelessly 
leaving slates on a private road, which was unlit. The builder knew the road was liable to 
be used.  The plaintiff’s horse was injured when his servant drove his horse and carriage 
into the slates at night.  The plaintiff’s servant was using the road ‘by leave and 
licence.’32  The builder claimed as a defence that he had had the owner’s permission to 
place the slates on the road. However, court indicated that the owners of the soil of the 
road would equally have been liable had they placed or expressly authorised the 
obstruction.33 Cases concerning trespassers were held not to be applicable.34  Southcote 
v Stanley35 was distinguished on two different bases. The first36 was that it was founded 
on the principle  
 that one who chooses to become a guest cannot complain of the insufficiency of 
 the accommodation afforded him.37 
                                           
29 Priestley v Fowler (1837) 3 M & W 1;  ‘the mere relation of master and servant does 
not create any implied duty on the part of the master to take more care of the servant 
than he may reasonably be expected to do of himself’:  Pollock CB at 249-250. 
30 At 250-251. The report at 25 LJ Ex 339, 340 has Bramwell B saying ‘leading another 
into danger would be an act of commission’. 
31 (1858) 4 CB (NS) 556.  Applied in Pickard v Smith (1861) 10 CB (NS) 470 (occupier of 
refreshment rooms and cellar at station liable where passenger fell through an open trap 
door on the platform over the cellar;  no contributory negligence). See also Gallagher v 
Humphrey (1862) 6 LT (NS) 634 (liability imposed for ‘superadded negligence’ in the 
operation of a crane which caused a load of sugar to fall on a passing licensee). 
32 Cockburn CJ at 563. Willes J at 566 referred to persons using the road by ‘leave’.   
33 Cockburn CJ at 563-564; Byles J at 568 (on the basis of joint and several liability). 
34 Cockburn CJ at 564; Williams J at 565. 
35 Above. 
36 All four judges attached weight to this point. 
37 Williams J at 565-566. 
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Here, by contrast, there was an ‘act of commission’38 and ‘the defendant had no right to 
set a trap for the plaintiff.’39  The case was regarded as ‘obvious’.40  The second 
distinction was this:41  
The proprietors of the soil held out an allurement whereby the plaintiff was 
induced to come upon the place in question: they held out this road to 
all persons having occasion to proceed to the asylum as the means of access 
thereto....Having, so to speak, dedicated the way to such of the general public as 
might have occasion to use it for that purpose, and having held it out as a safe 
and convenient mode of access to the establishment, without any reservation, it 
was not competent to them to place thereon any obstruction calculated to render 
the road unsafe, and likely to cause injury to those persons to whom they had 
held it out as a way along which they might safely go. 
This suggests that the entrant might have been regarded what came to be known as an 
‘invitee’.42 However, whether the plaintiff had been using the road for the purposes of 
the owner’s business was not raised as an issue.43 This passage in Cockburn CB’s 
judgement led to case law in the United States that supported the position that liability 
was normally based on ‘invitation’ rather than on the fact that entry was ‘on business’.44 
However, that position did not reflect English law.45  
                                           
38 Cockburn CJ in argument at 562. 
39Willes J at 567.  An inelegant phrase in that there is no suggestion that the defendant 
intended to harm the plaintiff or was reckless. 
40 Willes J at 567;  Byles J at 568.  Cf Hounsell v Smyth (above) where Williams J held 
that there was no duty to fence an excavation on waste land between two highways 
even if the plaintiff were there with tacit permission. The other judge who gave 
judgment in that case, Keating J, dealt with the case on the basis that the claimant was 
a trespasser. 
41 Per Cockburn CJ at 563-564. 
42 As was the interpretation placed on Corby by Pigot CB in Sullivan v Waters, below n 
49. Corby was subsequently treated as an authority on liability to licensees. 
43 Cf Parnaby, n 19 above, and Indermaur v Dames, n 50 below. The road led from the 
turnpike-road to Hanwell Lunatic Asylum and the adjoining residence of the 
superintendent, Dr Saunders.  It seemed that the plaintiff’s servant was going to the 
latter. 
44 W Prosser, ‘Business visitors and invitees’ (1941-42) 26 Minn L Rev 573. The factor 
that entry was ‘on business’ would only be crucial as regards entry to private premises. 
45 GW Paton, ‘Invitees’ (1942-43) 27 Min L Rev 75. 
 9 
As with invitees, there was no liability to licensees in respect of obvious risks.  In Bolch v 
Smith,46 it was held that no duty arose where the defendant had inadequately fenced off 
a shaft connecting a steam engine and a mill that lay across a path in a dockyard that 
the plaintiff was permitted to use.  The plaintiff injured himself when he slipped and fell 
against the shaft.  Corby v Hill was distinguished on the ground that, in the present 
case, the defect was apparent and there was nothing which could be called a ‘trap’.47 
 
Fourthly, cases where the plaintiff entered land by virtue of a contract with the occupier 
were regarded as raising a separate principle.  For example, a person who provided a 
temporary stand for people to pay to watch the Cheltenham races was held to be subject 
to an implied term that the stand was reasonably fit and proper for the purpose, except 
that there would be no liability for unknown defects not reasonably discoverable.48 
 
 B Indermaur v Dames 
 
The first attempts at a more systematic analysis came with Sullivan v Waters49 and 
Indermaur v Dames.50  In Sullivan v Waters the question was whether the owner of a 
distillery owed to a ‘mere licensee’ permitted to sleep in the loft of a distillery a duty to 
fence and light an aperture in the loft floor.  Pigot CB for the court reviewed the cases, 
noted that there seemed to be distinction between cases where the entrant was 
‘expressly invited’ or a business customer and cases of a ‘mere’ visitor, guest or 
                                           
46 (1862) 7 H & N 736. 
47 Wilde B at746. 
48 Francis v Cockrell (1870) LR 5 QB 501, per Kelly CB at 503, 508, Martin B at 511 and 
Keating J at 512-513.  Montague Smith J at 513 and Cleasby B at 514 found that there 
had been an implied undertaking that due care had been taken. The latter was applied in 
John v Bacon (1870) LR 5 CP 437 (in respect of the duty owed by a steamer company to 
a passenger).  See also Dunster v Hollis [1918] 2 KB 795 (landlord under an implied 
contractual obligation to take reasonable care to keep common staircase reasonably 
safe). There was a substantial body of cases considering when the different approaches 
should apply. 
49 (1864) 14 ICLR 460. 
50 (1866) LR 1 CP 274, Court of Exchequer, aff’d (1867) 2 CP 311, Court of Exchequer 
Chamber. 
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licensee, but could discern no clear general rule or test.51  On the facts, the claim failed 
as there was no obligation to guard a mere licensee against an existing, apparent source 
of danger. 
 
This paved the way for the leading decision in Indermaur v Dames.   Here, the defendant 
sugar-refiner, Dames, owned premises with several floors.  A partially unfenced hole or 
shoot was left in each floor to enable sugar to be raised and lowered from the different 
storeys.  Indermaur was a gas-fitter whose employer, Duckham, had fitted a gas 
regulator in the refinery.  Under the contract, the defendants’ gas burners were to be 
inspected by Duckham.  One evening, Indermaur entered the premises to do this and, in 
the dark, fell through the hole and fractured his spine.  His claim for damages was 
upheld at trial and by the Court of Exchequer.  The jury found that the plaintiff had not 
been negligent.  The defendant argued that there was no duty to fence as the plaintiff 
was a mere licensee and there was no misfeasance.  The judgment of the court52 was 
delivered by Willes J.  The argument that the plaintiff was a bare licensee was rejected 
on the ground that he was there ‘on lawful business, fulfilling a contract in which both 
the plaintiff and defendant had an interest.’53 
 
It seemed that there would be liability to a bare licensee in the case of ‘active negligence 
in respect of unusual danger known to the host and not to the guest’ as distinct from ‘a 
bare defect of construction or repair, which the host was only negligent in not finding out 
or anticipating the consequence of.’54 
                                           
51 The analysis was not wholly convincing.  The difficulties of distinguishing omissions 
from ‘acts of commission’ were overstated. 
52 Erle CJ, Willes, Keating and Montague Smith JJ. 
53 At 285.  No distinction here was to be drawn between the position of Indermaur and 
his employer, Duckham, should the latter have entered the refinery. 
54 This was how Willes J (at 286) described the distinction drawn by Bramwell B in 
Southcote v Stanley, above.  Willes J also said that there was a resemblance although 
not a strict analogy to the principle that there was no remedy against a voluntary lender 
or giver, for damage sustained from the loan or gift, except in the case of unusual 
danger known to and concealed by the lender:  MacCarthy v Young (1861) 6 H & N 329; 
Farrant v Barnes (1862) 11 CB (NS) 553.  Note that the expression ‘unusual danger’ was 
used in respect of liability to invitees as well as liability to licensees:  see n.55. 
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However, the duty of an occupier of a building with respect ‘to persons resorting there in 
the course of business, upon his invitation, express or implied’ was different.  Such an 
entrant 
 is, according to an undoubted course of authority and practice, entitled to the 
 exercise of reasonable care by the occupier to prevent damage from unusual 
 danger, of which the occupier knows or ought to know, such as a trap-door left 
 open, unfenced and unlighted.55 
 
Where there was evidence of neglect, the question whether reasonable care had been 
taken ‘by notice, lighting, guarding or otherwise’56 and whether there had been 
contributory negligence was a question of fact.  On the facts, it had not been shown that 
there was any usage never to fence such shafts and it had been shown that when the 
shaft was not in use, ‘a fence might be resorted to without inconvenience.’57 The danger 
here was an unusual danger known to the defendant. 
 
This was subsequently treated as a classic case.  However, it is a little difficult to see 
what Willes J’s judgment added to the law beyond clarity of exposition. Willes J 
articulated a distinction already discernible in the law between the position of persons 
invited to enter on business58 and ‘bare licensees’.  He confirmed the level of duty owed 
to the former on essentially the same basis as before, confirming the liability as being 
one for a negligent omission.59 One unfortunate consequence was that Willes J’s 
                                           
55 At 287 His Lordship cited Lancaster Canal Co v Parnaby and Chapman v Rothwell, 
above.  The formulation of principle was repeated at 288, adding the point that the 
entrant had to take reasonable care of his own safety. 
56 At 288. 
57 At 288. 
58 Willes J did not use the term ‘invitee’. The term was used in argument in Anglo-
American Steamship Co v Houlder Line Ltd [1908] 1 KB 659, 662 and by Hamilton LJ in 
Latham v R Johnson & Nephew Ltd [1913] 1 KB 398, 410. 
59 Some commentators, however, suggested that this was a form of strict liability or a 
‘limited duty of insurance’, albeit falling short of liability under Rylands v Fletcher: F 
Pollock, A Treatise on the Law of Torts, 4th edn (London, Stevens and Sons, 1893) pp 
459-460 (in that the occupier ‘cannot discharge himself by employing an independent 
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definition of the class to whom the higher level of duty was owed was subsequently 
treated as exhaustive.60 That ruled out an argument that even where there was not a 
business element, a duty of affirmative action might arise, for example, from an 
invitation that held out premises as safe.61 Willes J did usefully made it clear62 that the 
liability of a shopkeeper to a customer did not turn on whether a contract was actually 
concluded.   
 
The terms used to set out the duty owed to a licensee were less clear.  (This can perhaps 
be explained by the fact that they were obiter.) There was endorsement of the idea that 
there was liability for ‘active negligence’ as distinct from a negligent omission and 
introduction of a possible analogy with cases in respect of voluntary loans or gifts. Willes 
J warmed to that analogy about 12 months later in Gautret v Egerton,63 when he spoke64 
of liability to a licensee arising in cases where the defendant was guilty of a 
 wrongful act, such as digging a trench on the land, or misrepresenting its 
 condition, or anything equivalent to laying a trap for the unwary passengers….To 
 create an action something like fraud is shown….Some wrongful act must be 
 shown, or a breach of some positive duty: otherwise, a man who allows strangers 
 to roam over his property would be held to be answerable against any danger 
 which they might encounter whilst using the licence. Every man is bound not 
 wilfully to deceive others, or to do any act which may place them in danger.65   
                                                                                                                                   
contractor for the maintenance and repair of the structure, however careful he may be in 
the choice of that contractor….Personal diligence on the part of the occupier and his 
servants is immaterial. The structure has to be in a reasonably safe condition, so far as 
the exercise of reasonable care and skill can make it so.’) See to similar effect P H 
Winfield, Law of Tort, 1st edn (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1937), pp 582, 591. 
60 It is not absolutely clear whether Willes J intended it to be exhaustive. His judgment in 
Gautret v Egerton (1867) LR 2 CP 371, 374 suggests that he did. 
61 Cf Cockburn CJ in Corby v Hill, above n 31. Implicit in this formulation is the notion of 
reasonable reliance by the entrant. It is debateable whether all invitations to enter 
premises (as distinct from permissions) carry such an implied representation.  
62 At 287-288. 
63 (1867) LR 2 CP 371. 
64 At 374-375.   
65 In Gautret, the Court of Common Pleas held that a licensee could not complain of an 
injury caused because a bridge was out of repair; it was not alleged that the defendant 
had done ‘anything, equivalent to laying a trap’ (Willes J at 374).  It should be noted 
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It is submitted that the applicable principle was perhaps more helpfully captured in the 
earlier proposition that an occupier would be liable for an unusual danger known to him 
or her and not to the licensee.  However, the position was complicated unnecessarily by 
the invocation of expressions such as ‘trap’, ‘something like fraud’ and ‘wilful’.  This 
language raised but did not address an analytical uncertainty as to whether liability to a 
licensee was indeed liability in negligence.   Was liability confined to cases where the 
occupier intended to harm the licensee directly or indirectly or was reckless?66 One 
further uncertainty left by the supposedly ‘classical’ judgments in Indermaur and Gautret 
was whether liability to a licensee might arise in the case of what might be termed 
reckless omissions.67  
 C Developments after Indermaur v Dames 
 
The ninety or so years after Indermaur v Dames saw the creation of a vast, complex 
body of case law that put (somewhat mangled) flesh on the bones of the distinction 
confirmed in that case.68  Among the points addressed (and not necessarily solved) were 
(1) the boundaries of the distinctions between invitees and licensees69 and between 
licensees and trespassers;70  the content of the duties owed respectively to these two 
                                                                                                                                   
that the plaintiff’s argument, unsuccessful on the facts, was that the defendants knew 
the bridge to be unsafe; they did not argue that there should be liability on the basis 
that the defendants ought to have known of the defect. 
66 ie D actually foresees harm to P and goes on unreasonably to take the risk. The 
concept of ‘recklessness’ was not referred to in those terms in occupiers’ liability cases 
outside liability to trespassers. 
67 A concept lying between the two propositions of Willes J reproduced at nn 54 and 55. 
It subsequently became clear that the occupier was obliged to warn a licensee of a 
concealed danger in the nature of a trap of which he or she knew, irrespective of when it 
was created and by whom: see eg Lord Sumner in Mersey Docks and Harbour Board v 
Procter [1923] AC 253, 274. For another ambiguity see n 115 below.  
68 See eg J Charlesworth, The Law of Negligence, 2nd edn (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 
1947) Ch VIII. The case law on the invitee/licensee distinction was described as ‘a 
chaos’: Lord Wright, ‘Invitation’ (1951-53) 1 University of Western Australia Annual Law 
Review 543, 549. Other critics included W Friedmann,’Liability to visitors of premises’ 
(1944) 1 SALJ 418. 
69 See eg Smith v London and St Katharine Docks Co (1868) LR 3 CP 326 (dock company 
provided gangway enabling person with business on board ship to go aboard; gangway 
held to be provided as part of the dock company’s business); Heaven v Pender (1883) 
11 QBD 503 (staging provided by dock owner to enable ship to be painted there for 
business in which dock owner was interested). 
70 See eg Lowery v Walker [1911] AC 10. 
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classes of entrant;71  (2) whether a higher level of duty should be owed to trespassers;72 
(3) whether a higher level of duty should be owed to child entrants;73 (4) what level of 
duty should be owed to entrants with a right to enter conferred by law;74 (5) what level 
of duty should be owed to contractual entrants;75 (6) the position that arose where the 
plaintiff was aware of the danger;76 (7) whether an occupier was liable for the negligence 
of a carefully selected independent contractor;77 and whether the occupiers’ liability 
cases were relevant to non-occupying contractors.78 Cases might arise because litigants 
were seeking to change the law, normally to impose higher standards on occupiers, or 
simply because uncertainties needed to be resolved. 
 
The most significant decisions were four cases in the House of Lords, each in its different 
way unfortunate.  First, the House in Fairman v Perpetual Investment Building Society79 
                                           
71 On licensees see eg Tebbutt v The Bristol and Exeter Railway Co (1870) LR 6 QB 73 
(company vicariously liable for negligence of porter who negligently drove a truck so that 
a portmanteau fell off and injured a licensee;  liability imposed for ‘act of misfeasance’); 
White v France (1877) LR 2 CPD 308 (bale of goods left balanced at the edge of a 
warehouse trap-door  held to be a ‘concealed source of mischief’):  Ellis v Fulham 
Borough Council [1938] 1 KB 212 (council liable to child in respect of glass in paddling 
pool;  sufficient that the council knew of the possibility of danger);cf Coleshill v Mayor of 
the City of Manchester [1928] 1 KB 776 (trench in road under construction not a 
‘concealed trap’).  On invitees see eg Norman v Great Western Railway [1915] 1 KB 584 
(duty of railway company to persons entering on business not higher than duty owed to 
invitee by occupier of private premises; criticised by WH Griffith, (1916) 32 LQR 255, 
arguing that the duty was indeed higher). 
72 See Addie v Dumbreck, below. 
73 See Cooke v Midland Great Western Railway of Ireland [1909] AC 229, HL (as 
explained in Latham v R Johnson & Nephew Ltd [1913] 1 KB 398 and Addie v Dumbreck) 
(no special rules for child entrants; defendant company in Cooke held liable where child 
licensee was injured on an unguarded turntable held to be a ‘trap’).   
74 The position remained confused, except that it came to be settled that persons using 
public facilities such as a park were licensees Norman v Great Western Railway [1915] 1 
KB 584, above. 
75 See eg Maclenan v Sugar [1917] 2 KB 325; WTS Stallybrass, Salmond on the Law of 
Torts, 7th edn (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1928), pp 446-451. 
76 See eg Woodley v The Metropolitan District Railway Co (1877) 2 Ex D 384 (volenti 
defence applied); Norman v Great Western Railway [1915] 1 KB 584 (unattended horse 
(with cart) in large station yard backed into unfenced culvert; no evidence of any 
negligence or that any negligence caused the harm); London Graving Dock v Horton, 
below n 112. 
77 No:  Haseldine v CA Daw and Son Ltd [1941] 2 KB 343,CA; Yes:  Thomson v Cremin 
[1953] 2 All ER 1185, HL (but decided in 1941 before Haseldine). 
78 No: AC Billings & Sons Ltd v Riden [1958] AC 240. 
79 [1923] AC 74. 
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held by a majority80 that a visitor to a tenant of a flat using a common staircase 
maintained by the landlord was only a licensee vis-à-vis the landlord.  This was not an 
obvious conclusion, given that the value of premises to the tenant (and therefore the 
rent chargeable by the landlord) would obviously be significantly greater if the landlord 
permitted the tenant to have visitors.81  Lord Atkinson seemed to have been influenced 
by the label ‘invitee’ rather than the principle underlying the category.  The plaintiff was 
using the stairs at the ‘invitee of the tenant, though not of the landlord:’ 
 
 There is nothing in the case to support the suggestion that the tenant was 
 authorised by the landlord to act as the latter’s agent to invite her.  The landlord 
 gave her no invitation, it would appear to me, either direct or indirect, to use 
 these stairs.82 
 
Lord Wrenbury propounded83 a clear non sequitur: ‘She was….the invitee of the tenant, 
and, in consequence, the licensee of the  landlord.’ Lord Sumner said84 that in this case 
it made no difference to liability whether the plaintiff was an invitee or licensee, but then 
applied the test appropriate for licensees.   
 
The lack of distinction in the speeches was compounded by dicta erroneously suggesting 
that a licensor was liable for dangers of which he or she “has knowledge, or ought to 
have knowledge”.85  The House was in fact not invited to modify the structure 
                                           
80 Lords Atkinson, Summer and Wrenbury.  Lord Buckmaster stated at 84 that the 
plaintiff, as a lodger, ‘had…a material interest in the use of the premises and could not 
be regarded as a mere guest or casual visitor.’  Lord Carson (at 98-99) was unclear on 
the point.  Lord Buckmaster and Carson were agreed that on the facts there was a 
concealed danger not obvious to the plaintiff using ordinary care. 
81 Cf Scott v London and St Katharine Docks Co, above, n 69. 
82 At 85.  The decision in Scott was distinguished by Lord Atkinson at 90 on the 
implausible basis that it turned on there having been an ‘unusual or covert danger of 
which the plaintiff knew nothing’.  The court in Scott clearly imposed the standard 
applicable to an invitee. 
83 At 95. 
84 At 92. 
85 Lord Atkinson at 86; Lord Wrenbury at 96, 97.  These dicta were rejected by the Court 
of Appeal in subsequent cases. 
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established in the nineteenth century and showed no inclination to do so outside these 
dicta.86 
 
The second case was Robert Addie and Sons (Collieries) Ltd v Dumbreck.87  The 
defendant colliery established a haulage system for carrying spoil from the pithead to an 
adjoining field in their ownership.  An endless cable passed round a large wheel in the 
field.  The wheel was not visible from the pithead.  The defendant knew that the field 
was used as a playground by young children, there being many gaps in the hedges 
between the fields and the public road, 100 yards away from the wheel.  Colliery officials 
from time to time warned children out of the field, but the defenders were aware that 
children disregarded the warnings.  A boy of 4½ was crushed in the wheel when it was 
set in motion by colliery employees, without any precautions being taken.  The boy had 
been told by his father not to go near the field or the wheel.  The Court of Session88 
found for the pursuer.  Lord Clyde89 held that the defenders were liable either on the 
basis that they had consented to the boy’s presence, given that they had done little to 
prevent public resort to the field or, if the boy was a trespasser, on the ground that they 
were aware that adults or children might be at the machine when it was started.  The 
latter situation was not to be distinguished from the situation if the collier employees had 
at the time they started the machine seen the trespasser on or so near the mechanism 
as to be likely to be injured.  In the House of Lords the respondents defended the 
outcome in the court below on the ground that the boy had been an implied licensee.  It 
was conceded that the principle that there might be liability of the landowner ‘knew that 
a child was likely to be there’ had never been applied to a trespasser.90  Lord Hailsham 
LC regards the status of the boy as an entrant as the only question arising for 
                                           
86 Lord Atkinson at 86 referred to the passage from Willes J’s judgment in Indermaur v 
Danes setting out the duty owed to an invitee (LR 1 CP 274, 288) as having ‘for the last 
fifty-six years been accepted as a full and accurate statement of the law.’ 
87 [1929] AC 358. See WO Hart, ‘Injuries to trespassers’ (1931) 92 LQR 92. 
88 1928 SC 547. 
89 At 553-554.  Lord Sands agreed with Lord Clyde.  Lord Blackburn dissented, stating 
that the result would have been different if the employees had known when they started 
the wheel that a child was in the vicinity: p.559. 
90 Counsel for the respondents at 363. 
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determination, and found that he was a trespasser, in view of the warnings given.  The 
law recognised only three categories of entrant, invitee, licensee and trespasser.  There 
was no fourth category.91 An occupier had no duty to take reasonable care to protect a 
trespasser, even from a concealed danger: 
 The trespasser comes on to the premises at his own risk.  An occupier is in such 
 a case liable only where the injury is due to some wilful act involving something 
 more than the absence of reasonable care.  There must be some act done with 
 the deliberate intention of doing harm to the trespasser, or at least some act 
 done with reckless disregard of the presence of the trespasser.92  
Two earlier decisions of the House93 (in which a generous view had been taken or upheld 
in classifying the entrant as a licensee) afforded no ground for the contention that a 
higher duty than this was owed to trespassers. 
 
This decision came to be widely criticised as adopting an unduly restrictive approach.  
The statements of legal principle were consistent with the previous case law,94 but there 
was no previous ratio by which the House was bound.  The two main criticisms that can 
be made lie in their application to the facts.  First, as it was obviously a borderline case, 
it would have been open to the House to decline to interfere with the inference from the 
facts apparently95 drawn by the Court of Session.96  Why were they insistent on the 
                                           
91 Lord Hailsham LC at 364-365.  At 365 his Lordship misstated obiter the level of duty 
owed to a licensee by referring to liability for concealed dangers that ‘ought to be known’ 
to the occupier.  This echoed Fairman (above n 79) which was not cited.   See PMW 
[1930] CLJ at 79, pointing out the problem.  See also Viscount Dunedin at 371 stating 
that ‘the line that separates each of these three classes is an absolutely rigid line.  There 
is no half-way house, no no-man’s land between adjacent territories.’  He acknowledged 
that on the facts of a case it might be difficult to decide which category applies.   
92 At 365. 
93 Cooke v Midland Great Western Railway of Ireland [1909] AC 229; Lowery v Walker 
[1911] AC 10. 
94 ‘The House, led by Hailsham and egged on by that éminence grise, the editor of the 
Law Quarterly Review (Pollock), in a speech that looked solely to precedent, willingly 
held the child a trespasser and thus owed no duty of care’ : R Stevens, Law and Politics 
(London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1979), 242. Pollock commended the decision: (1929) 
45 LQR 280. 
95 Viscount Dunedin at 372 said that ‘there is no finding in terms that licence was 
implied’. Lord Clyde’s opinion is open to a different interpretation. 
 18 
conclusion that the boy was a trespasser?  An indication can be seen in Viscount 
Dunedin’s wish to protest at a proposition that seemed to be countenanced in some of 
the cases: ‘that unless a proprietor takes such measures as effectively to stop trespass, 
the trespasser becomes a licensee.’97 Such a position would obviously place significant 
burdens on landowners.  However, a finding in this case that the boy was a trespasser 
would not have depended on any such proposition.  On the evidence, the steps taken to 
prevent trespassers seemed desultory.98 The second problem was the lack of attention, 
both in argument and in the opinions, to the possibility of a finding on the facts of 
recklessness.  The defenders knew children frequented the field and had no system to 
prevent an accident, of which there was an obvious risk.99  There was no analysis of the 
concept of “recklessness” and members of the House seemed to assume that it was a 
very narrow concept.100  Viscount Dunedin101 referred with apparent approval, to a case 
where the defenders employees had begun shunting knowing that the child trespassers 
were on the line as an example of ‘malicious’ injury for which liability was imposed.102   
 
That the concept of recklessness, properly understood, is wider than that was illustrated 
by the subsequent decision of the House in Excelsior Wire Rope Co v Callan.103  Here, the 
defendants, licensees of the land in question, used a wire rope, which passed through a 
sheave, to move trucks in a siding.  They knew children from a neighbouring playground 
(there was no boundary fence) played round the sheave.  The practice on the occasions 
when the rope was to be used was for the defendants’ employees to go across to the 
                                                                                                                                   
96 As the House of Lords in Lowery v Walker [1911] AC 10 had restored the finding of the 
county court judge that the plaintiff had been a licensee. 
97 Viscount Dunedin at 372. 
98 ‘The watch kept by the appellants servants was casual and ineffective, except in so far 
as it was directed to guarding the wood piles and coal bings’:  statement of facts at 360. 
99 Lord Hailsham LC noted at 369 that, had the child been a licensee, the claim would 
have succeeded on the basis that the wheel was a ‘trap’ (ie a concealed trap of which the 
defender knew). 
100 Lord Hailsham LC (at 367) also referred to the duty to a trespasser as ‘the duty not 
maliciously to cause him injury’; Viscount Dunedin (at 377) to ‘acting so reckless as to 
be tantamount to malicious acting’; Lord Shaw (at 378) to ‘loss and injury wilfully 
inflicted’. 
101 At 376. 
102 Devlin v Jeffray’s Trustees (1902) 5 F 130. 
103 [1930] AC 404. 
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sheave and drive children away.   On one occasion they did this, went back and started 
the machine.  If they had looked up they would have seen that a girl of 5 had returned 
and was swinging on the rope.  Her hands were crushed.  The Court of Appeal held that, 
on the assumption she was a trespasser, this was a case of reckless disregard.  The 
House of Lords dismissed the appeal, although the precise grounds were unclear. 
 
Lord Atkin regarded the cases on occupier’s liability as irrelevant as the defendants were 
mere licensees; they owed a duty to the children to take reasonable precautions to see 
that they were not injured.104 Lord Thankerton dealt with the matter as one involving 
liability to a licensee.105  Lords Buckmaster and Warrington simply asserted that on the 
facts there was a duty to see that no child was there, without explaining why.106  
Viscount Dunedin regarded this as a case of reckless disregard, but would have been 
prepared to find that the child was a licensee.107 The task of reconciling Addie and 
Excelsior proved difficult for subsequent cases and commentators.  The only factual 
difference appeared to be that in Excelsior, the defendants’ employees could have seen 
the child if they had looked.108 
 
The third troublesome decision was in Jacobs v London County Council,109 where the 
plaintiff crossing on foot the forecourt outside a shop on her way to the shop tripped on 
a stopcock and broke her leg.  The shop was let to a tenant by the LCC; the LCC 
remained as owner and occupier of the forecourt.  The House of Lords held that the 
plaintiff was only a licensee on the forecourt.  The sole opinion was delivered by Lord 
Simonds, who strongly rejected an argument that the observations in Fairman110 on the 
                                           
104 At 412-413.  But could it have been argued that the defendants were occupiers of the 
structure? Cf Viscount Dunedin at 411. 
105 At 413-414. 
106 At 410, 412. 
107 At 416. 
108 See eg Mourton v Porter [1930] 2 KB 183. 
109 [1950] AC 361. 
110 Above, n 79.  This view had been taken by Scott LJ in Haseldine v CA Daw & Son Ltd 
[1941] 2 KB 343. 
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status of the entrant in that case were obiter, holding them to be a second ratio 
decidendi.111  On the facts, Fairman was indistinguishable. 
 
The fourth was London Graving Dock Ltd v Horton112 where the House of Lords held by 3 
to 2,113 reversing the Court of Appeal,114  that an occupier was not liable to an invitee 
where the invitee had full knowledge of the unusual danger in question, inadequate 
staging in a ship where the plaintiff was engaged in welding operations.  This resolved an 
ambiguity in the law as stated in Indermaur v Dames that had long been recognised,115 
notwithstanding the supposedly classical nature of Willes J’s judgment.  The majority 
judges simply asserted that the narrower interpretation of Indermaur was correct.116  
There were two strong dissents.  Lord MacDermott noted that on the majority’s approach 
in effect ‘sciens can be said to come to the same thing as volens’117 and found it difficult 
to discern any sound reason in favour of the rule adopted by the majority.118  Both he 
and Lord Reid regarded the matter as one of principle which was not settled by previous 
authority.119  Both accepted that, in particular circumstances, the duty of care might on 
the facts be discharged by giving notice.120  Lord Reid said that in the realms of 
negligence ‘rigid rules give rise to what I believe to be avoidable injustice’ and saw ‘no 
reason to depart unnecessarily from the simple method of asking in any case what a 
                                           
111 Lord Simonds was not always consistent on this kind of issue:  see R Stevens, Law 
and Politics (London, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1979), pp 352-353. 
112 [1951] AC 737. 
113 Lords Porter, Normand and Oaksey, Lords MacDermott and Reid dissenting. 
114 [1950] 1 KB 421. 
115 See eg. WTS Stallybrass, Salmond on the Law of Torts, 7th edn (London, Sweet & 
Maxwell, 1928), pp 461-464.  Was the minimum duty one to take reasonable care that 
the premises were safe or merely to warn? 
116 See Lord Porter at 747, 749; Lord Oaksey at 757-758.  Lord Normand (at 754) 
thought the point settled by a series of decisions concerning harbour authorities and 
ships entering the harbour. 
117 ie knowledge was sufficient to establish consent, a proposition firmly rejected in cases 
on the volenti defence.  See to similar effect Lord Reid at 783-784. 
118 At 764. 
119 At 762, 774. 
120 At 772, 777. 
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reasonable man in the shoes of the defendant might have done.’121  The dissents were 
cogent and persuasive, and were strongly endorsed by commentators.122 
 
The results of these four House of Lords decisions was to leave the law in an 
unsatisfactory state in a number of respects.  In each case the House had exercised 
choices in such a way as to limit the liability of the occupier as against the entrant.  
Whether this can be explained on the theory that the judges were predisposed by their 
social background to favour the interests of property owners can only be speculative. 
What is reasonably clear is that the processes of reasoning adopted by many of the 
judges was not untypical of the era in which the case was decided, being marked by 
reliance on precedents rather than principle and a lack of any apparent wish to identify 
and analyse the purposes served by competing principles. 
 
III Law Reform and the Law Reform Committee 
 
Law reform by judges depends on the accidents of case law, the willingness of judges to 
develop the law and the extent to which the legal system gives them room for 
manoeuvre.  Law reform by Parliament largely depends on the priorities of the 
government of the day, both in determining their own legislative programme and in 
deciding which Private Members Bills should be given a fair wind. It is relatively easy for 
Private Members Bills to be blocked. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries there 
were many voices raised in support of the reform of different aspects of the law.123  
Themes in the nineteenth century were reforms promoting the rights of the individual, a 
gradual rationalisation of the court structure and the growth of collectivism, with a shift 
of attention from the individual to the group and from the middle class to the working 
                                           
121 At 785. 
122 Including Lord Wright, ‘Invitation’ (1951-53) 1 University of Western Australia Annual 
Law Review 543. Lord Wright, unusually for a former Law Lord writing extra-judicially, 
subjected the opinions in Horton to detailed adverse criticism. See also D Lloyd, (1950) 
13 MLR 230. 
123 See JH Farrar, Law Reform and the Law Commission (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 
1974) Ch 1. 
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class.124  There were some examples of codification.125  A Law Revision Committee was 
established in 1934 by the Lord Chancellor Lord Sankey.126  Its reports were regarded as 
reforming “lawyers’ law”;  its work lapsed on the outbreak of the second world war and 
there was thought to be no room for re-establishing such machinery in the immediate 
post-war years, given the extensive legislative programme of the 1945-51 Labour 
government.  However, the Law Reform Committee was established as the successor to 
the Law Revision Committee in 1952, by the Conservative Lord Chancellor, Lord 
Simonds.127  It continued as a part-time body but, unlike its predecessor, it had a 
permanent secretariat from within the Lord Chancellor’s Department. 
 
The topic of ‘Occupiers’ liability to invitees, licensees and trespassers’ was the subject of 
the Committee’s Third Report in 1954.128  The choice of topic is readily understandable 
given the growing tide of criticism of decisions in this area.  At least at first sight the 
distinction between invitees and licensees would seem also to be more ‘lawyers’ law’ 
than ‘politicians’ law’, although any extension of liability to trespassers might be 
expected to arouse political controversy. 
 
Part I of the Report summarised the existing law, but did contain criticisms as it went 
along.  The terminology of ‘invitee’ and ‘licensee’, while no doubt the best that could be 
devised, was ‘unfortunate and, to the uninstructed, misleading’.129  While many cases 
spoke of the need for a ‘common interest’ for there to be a relationship of invitor-invitee, 
                                           
124 Ibid, p 7. 
125 Ibid, pp 8-9;  partnership;  bills of exchange and sale of goods;  real property. 
126 Ibid, pp 10-11.  Among its reports that led to legislation affecting tort Law were 
reports on contribution between tortfeasors, limitations and contributory negligence. 
127 pp 11-14;  Viscount Kilmuir, (1957) 4 JSPTL (NS) 75; ECS Wade, (1961) 24 MLR 3.   
128 Cmd 9305.  For a full list see Farrer, op cit pp 135-137.  The committee at the time of 
this report was chaired by Jenkins LJ and comprised judges (including Lord Goddard (to 
August 1954 and Devlin J), practising lawyers (including Kenneth Diplock QC and Gerald 
Gardiner QC) and academics (including Professors AL Goodhart, Sir David Hughes Parry 
and ECS Wade). 
129 p 7: for example, a person invited to dinner was a mere licensee whereas a customer 
entering a shop was an invitee notwithstanding the absence of any invitation ‘in the 
ordinary sense of that expression’. 
 23 
the more logical view130 was that what was needed was that the occupier had a material 
interest in the purpose of the other party’s visit, whether or not that was shared by the 
other party.131  On the issue of the effect of an invitee’s knowledge of the existence of an 
unusual danger, the Committee preferred the view of the Court of Appeal and the 
minority in the House of Lords in Horton.132 The term ‘unusual danger’ ‘defies 
comprehensive definition’.133  The distinction between a ‘concealed danger or trap’ and 
an ‘unusual danger’ was a narrow one.134   
 
In contrast, the duty of an occupier of premises to trespassers did not call for much 
comment.135  The conventional categories were said to be exhaustive, but 
 it can hardly be denied that there are certain types of visitor to whom none of 
 the existing categories seems wholly appropriate, and many others whose 
 allocation to one rather than another of the existing categories is a matter of 
 doubt and difficulty.136 
The Committee’s own attempt at enumerating classes of entrants identified seven:  (i) 
persons exercising public rights of way;137 (ii) persons exercising private rights of 
way;138 (iii) persons lawfully using premises provided for the use of the public;139 (iv) 
persons entering by lawful authority;140 (v) contractual licensees;141 (vi) persons (other 
than contractual licensees) coming upon premises at the invitation or by the permission 
of the occupier (express or implied); (viii) trespassers.142 
 
                                           
130 Scott LJ in Haseldine v Daw [1941] 2 KB 343, 352. 
131 Third Report, p7.  The Committee was critical of the decision in Fairman:  p 9. 
132 pp 10-13.  See above n 112. 
133 p 14. 
134 Ibid. 
135 pp 15-16. 
136 p 16. 
137 Really a special category, subject to Gautret v Egerton (1867) LR 2 CP 371, 373, 
above, n 63. 
138 Should be governed by the law of easements and of landlord and tenant. 
139 Arguably should be regarded as invitees not licensees as laid down in the case law. 
140 Should be regarded as invitees. 
141 Practical difficulties in deciding which contractual term should be implied. 
142 ‘No particular difficulty arises’ in respect of liability to an undoubted trespasser 
although the line between trespasser and implied licensee was a debateable area. 
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Part II of the Report set out criticisms of the existing law and suggested amendments.  
It noted on the one hand Atkin LJ’s view143 that while the current law compelled 
distinctions to be drawn that were ‘subtle and apt to be confused’, they did ‘correspond 
to real differences in the nature of the user of property and in the reasonable claims to 
protection of those who are permitted such use.  On the other was the view Salmond on 
Torts144 that the law was still in a confused state. 
 
 Had it been earlier and more generally recognised that the topic is only one 
 branch of the law of negligence it might have been seen that the occupier’s duties 
 cannot conveniently be put into strait jackets to fit the character in which the 
 plaintiff comes on to the premises and the law would then have been freed of 
 some needless refinements and profitless distinctions. 
 
The recommendations as to the substance of the law were these.145 
 
First, as regards contractual entrants, there were no precise and satisfactory tests for 
the application of two or more standards of care of differing degrees of stringency, the 
relevant standard of care should be either that specified in the contract or the common 
duty of care owed to all lawful visitors.  In the latter case, the existence and nature of 
the contact should be included in the circumstances to which regard should be had in 
determining whether the common duty of care had been discharged in any particular 
case.  Where a person contracting for the use of premises enabling him to permit third 
persons to use them, then the common duty of care should be owed unless the contract 
provided for a higher duty.146   
 
                                           
143 Coleshill v Manchester Corporation [1928] 1 KB 776, 791. 
144 WTS Stallybrass, 10th edn (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1945), p 471. 
145 pp 22-39. 
146 Changing the law as set out in Fosbroke-Hobbes v Airwork Ltd [1937] 1 All ER 108, 
112, which was that the duty was the same as that owed to the party to the contract. 
 25 
Secondly, as regards non-contractual entrants, the distinction between invitees and 
licensees should be abolished.  Starting with a ‘clean slate’ the committee thought that 
an occupier should be under a duty of care, apart from contract, for these reasons. 
 
 An occupier of premises has them under his control.  Their condition, be it safe 
 or dangerous, is a matter peculiarly within his own knowledge or potential 
 knowledge.147 
 
The occupier must be assumed to know that dangers on his premises which he causes or 
permits to exist may be a source of danger to lawful entrants: 
 
 It is therefore an act or neglect prima facie constituting an actionable wrong to 
 any persons in fact so damaged.148 
 
This was ‘comparable in point of ethical origin’ to the duty to prevent the wall of a house 
falling on and injuring a person lawfully present on adjoining premises.  It would seem to 
follow from this that as a general rule, the same standard of care should apply to all 
lawful visitors. 
 
However, that was not the law.  The justification for the higher duty owed to an invitee 
was analogous to a contractual duty arising from an implied bargain. While there was an 
air of reasonableness about this when applied to the stock examples of a shop customer 
and a person allowed for his own convenience to take a short cut across a field, the 
distinction could not be rationally maintained in respect of the ‘whole range of almost 
infinitely variable circumstances’ of entry to premises.  Many examples were given of the 
arbitrary nature of decisions on the borderline.149   
                                           
147 p 25. 
148 Ibid. 
149 eg dinner guests one of whom talks business; a person who goes into a shop to ask 
the way;  a knife grinder visiting premises and given knives to grind. 
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Thirdly, persons lawfully using premises provided for the use of the public should be 
owed no less stringent a duty than that owed to invitees.  
 
Fourthly, persons entering premises by lawful authority were not easily characterised as 
an invitee or licensee and the duty owed to them should be ascribed to the legality of 
their entry and the occupier’s knowledge that such persons may enter. 
 
Fifthly, no workable exception could be made in respect of persons allowed to use 
premises merely for own convenience or advantage, or benefitting merely from implied 
permission.   
 
Sixthly, the standards owed to invitees at common was, with two modifications,150 
suitable to be adopted as the standard owed to all lawful entrants,151 and was equivalent 
to a duty to take reasonable care to see that the premises are reasonably safe. 
 
Seventhly, a landlord should owe the common duty of care to any third party using 
means of access remaining in the landlord’s occupation.152   
 
Eighthly, no change was recommended in the law concerning adult or (by a majority153) 
child trespassers. 
 
                                           
150 Reversing Horton and Thomson v Cremin:  above nn 112, 77. 
151 One factor was recent decisions expanding liability on the basis of imputed 
knowledge:  Ellis v Fulham Borough Council [1938] 1 KB 212; Pearson v Lambeth 
Borough Council [1950] 2 KB 353; Hawkins v Coulsdon and Purley UDC [1954] 1 QB 
319. 
152 Reversing Fairman and Jacobs. 
153 It was difficult to evolve an exception for child trespassers which would provide a 
substantial degree of protection without imposing too heavy a burden on occupiers:  
p.35. 
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Ninthly, members of a tenant’s family and lawful visitors to the tenant injured by defects 
arising from breach of the landlord’s repairing obligations owed to the tenant should be 
able to sue the landlord.154 
 
There was a minority report by Kenneth Diplock QC155 (as he then was) whose view was 
that this branch of the common law was not suitable for a statutory code.156  A statutory 
definition of the duty would be less flexible than a definition laid down by a court of law 
able to draw factual distinctions that might not have been in the draftsman’s mind.  A 
wide statutory definition would create uncertainty.  The courts would seek to ascribe 
meaning to departures from the formulation in Indermaur v Dames.  Overall the law was 
now reasonably certain and not unsatisfactory.  The only changes should be the 
statutory elevation to invitees of persons lawfully on land to which the public have 
access and persons lawfully using means of access to let premises; the last point of the 
first change, and the ninth change proposed by the majority. 
 
There are a number of observations that can be made about the Report.  First the kinds 
of arguments deployed were essentially those used by judges when free to develop the 
common law.  Much is made of inconsistencies between judgments in decided cases and 
of hypothetical examples constructed to demonstrate the awkwardness of the 
distinctions drawn in the case law.  The likely views of ‘the hypothetical reasonable men 
of ordinary prudence’ were invoked.157   There was no reference to empirical evidence of 
how the law worked in practice.  Indeed it was clear that the committee was not 
expected and indeed was not given the resources to commission such research.  
 
                                           
154 Reversing Cavalier v Pope [1906] AC 428. 
155 pp 43-44. 
156 Lord Diplock subsequently acknowledged he had been wrong: () Australian law 
Journal . 
157 p 29.  There was no reference, however, to the Clapham omnibus or the London  
Underground.  
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Secondly, the Committee made a powerful case against the distinction between invitees 
and licensees on the ground of unworkability; there were indeed too many difficult 
borderline cases where the line was essentially arbitrary.  However, the theoretical 
analysis was unclear.  A major gap in the Report is the lack of any discussion of the 
restricted application of the ordinary law of negligence to an omission (in the sense of a 
failure to confer a benefit upon the plaintiff, such as protecting him or her from harm).  
 
The Committee’s ‘clean slate’ position158 applied without differentiation to acts and 
omissions and was that an act or neglect that might damage a lawful visitor was 
‘therefore’ prima facie an actionable wrong. 
 
There are two ways of interpreting this.  First, it may be that the Committee overlooked 
the act/omission distinction and thought it was simply applying Donoghue v Stevenson 
to occupiers’ liability.  However, Donoghue v Stevenson was not mentioned.  Secondly, it 
may be that the Committee understood that it was dealing with liability for omissions 
and was of the view that the occupier/visitor relationship, rather than the narrower 
analogy to contact, was sufficient to justify imposition of a duty of affirmative action. If 
so, the basis for that to be sufficient was asserted rather than explained.  The suggested 
analogy with the liability of an occupier to a person on neighbouring premises was 
contained in a sentence and no authorities were cited.159 
 
The report was both welcomed160 and criticised for not going far enough or being 
uncertain.161  Its recommendations were generally accepted by the government and 
taken forward in the Occupiers’ Liability Act 1957. 
                                           
158 n 147, above. 
159 One relevant authority is Cunard v Antifyre Ltd [1933] 1 KB 551, which was decided 
in the light of Donoghue v Stevenson, and imposed liability in respect of the fall of 
guttering from the roof of a building, in respect of which the defendant was the occupier, 
through the glass roof of a kitchen of which the plaintiff’s husband was the tenant, 
injuring the plaintiff. 
160 RFV Heuston, (1955) 18 MLR 271. FJ Odgers ([1955] CLJ 1) thought there would be 
substantial agreement with most of the recommendations, but was against codification. 
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IV The Occupiers’ Liability Act 1957 
 
Unlike its successor the Law Commission, the Law Reform Committee did not have the 
support of a Parliamentary draftsman to help prepare a draft Bill.162  The proposed 
reform was taken up by the government.  A draft Bill was prepared and discussed with 
members of the Law Reform Committee, which discussions led to a number of 
changes.163 The Bill was initially introduced in the House of Lords in the 1955-56 session, 
‘to give it an airing’.164  It was reintroduced in the Commons in December 1956165 and 
passed both Houses without amendment.166  It was generally welcomed on all sides, 
although there was concern from one member about the ‘considerable new burdens on 
owners and occupiers’;167 a proposal (defeated on a vote) that a child under 11 who 
would otherwise be a trespasser should be treated as a lawful visitor unless the occupier 
has taken reasonably sufficient steps to prevent the child entering or using the 
premises;168 an express defence of the right of the occupier to exclude liability by putting 
                                                                                                                                   
161 DW Bowett, ‘Law reform and occupier’s liability’ (1956) 19 MLR 172, criticising the 
position that a landlord or premises would not be liable for defects in the means of 
access to them unless it remained in occupation of them, and noting uncertainties in the 
distinction between a ‘movable structure’ and a chattel, and on the question whether an 
occupier is liable only for structural defects. 
162 See N. Hutton, ‘Mechanics of Law Reform’ (1961) 24 MLR 18.  Hutton was First 
Parliamentary Counsel to the Treasury.  The purpose of his article was to discuss how 
law reform committee recommendations were carried into effect. 
163 Hutton, op cit pp 27-29. 
164 Ibid, p 27.  See 197 HL Deb, 21 June 1956, cols 1181-1196; 119 HL Deb, 25 October 
1956, cols 1083-1086. The report was issued too late to be considered for the 1954-55 
session. 
165 HC Bill No 82. 
166 566 HC Deb, 6 March 1957, cols 461-480 (2nd reading);  568 HC Deb, 8 April 1957; 
col 910 (report and 3rd reading; Standing Committee A, 26 March 1957;  203 HL Deb, 2 
May 1957, cols 255-272 (2nd reading) 204 HL Deb, 4 June 1957 199-202 (committee);  
204 HL Deb, 4 June 1957, col 246 (3rd reading). 
167 Lord Clitheroe, 197 HL Deb, 21 June 1956, col 1194. 
168 Standing Committee A, 26 March 1957, cols 12-30:  the government resisted this on 
the basis that the Law Reform Committee had recommended no change on the Law 
relating to trespassers; that this would be a ‘very hard standard to impose in practice’; 
that it was difficult to justify picking a particular age; and that no reference had been 
made to whether the presence of the child was to be anticipated: the Solicitor-General at 
col 19.  Some members of the House of Lords were also concerned about the position of 
child trespassers: see 203 HL Deb, 2 May 1957 cols 259-272. The Lord Chancellor’s view 
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up an exclusion notice;169 and an unsuccessful attempt to secure for the occupier the 
right to have an action under the Act tried by a jury.170 
 
As enacted the Occupiers’ Liability Act 1957 was clearly structured and generally well 
drafted.  Sections 1 to 4 concerned liability in tort, including in s 4 the liability of a 
landlord; section 5 liability in contract. 
 
As regards liability in tort, the scope of sections 2 and 3 was said to be to regulate the 
duty owed by the occupier of premises to his or her visitors 
 in respect of the dangers due to the state of the premises or to things done or 
 omitted to be done on them.171 
 
This expression, which also appears in the Occupiers’ Liability Act 1984, has given rise to 
some definitional difficulty to which we shall return.  The scheme of sections 1 to 3 both 
refers back to the common law in answering the question ‘who owes a duty to whom?’  
and establishes new rules as to the content of the duty owed.  Thus ‘occupier’ means a 
person who would at common law be treated as an occupier and ‘visitor’ means a person 
who would be an invitee or licensee at common law.172 The new rules were that a 
‘common duty of care’, a duty to take such care as in all the circumstances of the case is 
reasonable to see that the visitor will be reasonably safe in using the premises for the 
purposes for which he is invited or permitted by the occupier to be there, is owed to all 
                                                                                                                                   
was that it was difficult ‘to find a solution to this problem which would not place an 
intolerable burden on the occupiers of land’:  204 HL Deb, 4 June 1957, col 201. 
169 The Solicitor-General, Standing Committee A, cols 30-32, defending inclusion of the 
words ‘or otherwise’ in clause 2.  See n 192. 
170 Standing Committee A, cols 41-46. 
171 1957 Act s.1(1).  In addition, the rules enacted by ss 2 and 3 are to ‘regulate the 
nature of the duty imposed by law in consequence of a person’s occupation or control of 
premises’:  s.1(2).  They also apply to the obligations of a person occupying or having 
control over any fixed or moveable structure, including any vessel, vehicle or aircraft:  
s.1(3)(a);  and obligations in respect of damage to property, including the property of 
non-visitors: s.1(3)(b). 
172 s 1(2).  A person entering premises in the exercise of access agreement or order 
under the National Parks and Access to the Countryside Act 1949 was expressly declared 
not to be a visitor:  s.1(4) an exclusion subsequently applied to rights under s.2(1) of 
the Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000 (the ‘right to roam’).  
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lawful visitors.173  The wording of the old duty to invitees is improved by removal of the 
reference to ‘unusual dangers’, and extended to licensees.  Circumstances relevant in 
determining the level of care that is reasonable include the degree of care to be 
expected of visitors, examples174 of which were that an occupier must be prepared for 
children to be less careful than adults and may expect that a person, in the exercise of 
his or her calling, will appreciate and guard against any special risks incident to it.175 
These propositions reflected both common sense and the existing law.  In determining 
whether the common duty of care has been discharged, regard is to be had to all the 
circumstances.  Two examples are given.  First, a warning of danger is not to be treated 
‘without more’ as discharging the duty unless it is enough to enable the visitor to be 
reasonably safe.  Second, an occupier is not to be answerable ‘without more’ where 
damage is caused by a danger due to the faulty execution of any work of construction, 
maintenance and repair by an independent contractor, and the occupier has acted 
reasonably in using, selecting and supervising the contractor. These reversed previous 
decisions,176 the latter to the benefit of the occupier.  The volenti defence was 
preserved.177 
 
Section 3 deals with the liability in tort applicable where the occupier of premises is 
bound by a contract with a third party to permit entry to or use by a stranger to the 
contract.178  The common duty of care owed to this person as a visitor cannot be 
excluded; any additional objections under the contract must be performed, although this 
element can be excluded.179 
                                           
173 s 2(2).  For the purposes of s 2, persons entering for any purpose in the exercise of a 
right conferred by law are to be treated as permitted by the occupier to be there for that 
purpose:  s.2(6). 
174 The 1957 Act was at that date unusual in using examples as a technique of drafting.  
Other early examples are the Bills of Exchange Act 1883 and the Geneva Conventions 
Act 1957. 
175 s 2(3)(a) and (b). 
176 Horton and Thomson v Cremin, above nn 112, 77. 
177 s 2(5). 
178 Defined in s.3(3). 
179 s(3)(1). Section 3(2) makes somewhat convoluted provision in respect of liability for 
independent contractors that is not thought to be intended to be different in outcome:  
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Section 4 provided for the reversal of Cavalier v Pope180 stating that where a landlord 
has under a tenancy an objection to the tenant for the maintenance or repair of the 
premises, the landlord owes to all persons who or whose goods are lawfully on the 
premises the same duty in respect of danger arising from any default in carrying out the 
objection as if he or she were the occupier and the persons or goods were there by 
invitation or permission.181 This provision was repealed182 and replaced by broader 
provisions in s 4 of the Defective Premises Act 1972.183 
 
Section 5 dealt with liability in contract.  Where persons enter or use or bring or send 
goods to any premises in exercise of a contractual right, the duty owed in respect of 
dangers due to the state of the premises or to things done or omitted to be done on 
them, in so far as it depends on an implied term, is to be the common duty of care.184 
 
The 1957 Act generally binds the Crown, does not extend to Scotland and Northern 
Ireland and came into force on 1 January 1958.185  
 
                                                                                                                                   
AM Dugdale and MA Jones, Clerk and Lindsell on Torts (19th edn, 2006), para 12-59.  A 
contract may expressly provide that the occupier may be liable for an independent 
contractor. 
180 [1906] AC 428.  
181 s 4(1).  Extended to sub-tenancies by s 4(2). 
182 By the Defective Premises Act 1972, s 6(4). 
183 This provides that where a landlord has an obligation to the tenant for the 
maintenance and repair of the premises, the landlord owes to all persons who might 
reasonably be affected by defects in the state of the premises a duty to take such care 
as is reasonable in all the circumstances to see that they are reasonably safe from 
personal injury or from damage to their property caused by a relevant defect (s 4(1)).  
The duty is owed if the landlord knows or ought to have known of the defect (s 4(2)).  A 
‘relevant defect’ is a defect in the state of the premises, existing at or after the earliest 
of the start of the tenancy, entry into the tenancy agreement or the taking of 
possession, and arising from a failure to carry out the objection (s 4(3)). This is broader 
than s 4 of the 1957 Act in that the duty can be owed to persons on or off the premises, 
including the tenant. 
184 s 5(1).  This applies to fixed or moveable structures;  s.5(2); but does not affect 
obligations under a contract for the hire of, or for the carriage for reward of persons or 
goods in, any vehicle, vessel, aircraft or other means of transport or under a contract of 
bailment:  s 5(3). 
185 ss 6-8. 
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The academic commentary on the Act was rather critical.  Payne186 found it ‘curious’ that 
the Law Reform Committee had considered that the element of material advantage to 
the occupier should in principle be irrelevant to the standard of care required given the 
general reluctance of English law to impose liability for omissions in the absence of a 
special relationship.  However, he noted that this factor might remain relevant on the 
facts of a particular case in determining whether there had been a breach of duty.  
Overall, while some reform was needed, ‘not everyone, it is thought, will agree that the 
method….adopted by the legislature was the best way of dealing with the subject.’  Many 
would think that the element of material advantage to the occupier ‘was a not inapt 
consideration on which to hinge different rules of liability.’187 As to the ‘supposedly 
ludicrous operation of the distinction between invitees and licensees in borderline cases,’ 
there were few legal distinctions that could not ‘to the untutored mind at least’ be made 
to appear ludicrous in borderline cases.  Rules were needed both to control the vagaries 
of juries and to limit the discretion of judges.  The more uncertain the law, the more 
cases would go to trial and appeal. 
 
Newark188 echoed Payne’s endorsement of the validity of the old distinction but was also 
critical of the drafting189 and foresaw a ‘spate of litigation’.  
 
In the event the Act does not seem to have proved problematic.190  Leaving aside the 
issue of the scope of both the 1957 and 1984 Acts, which is considered below,191 matters 
                                           
186 D Payne, ’The Occupiers’ Liability Act 1957’ (1958) 21 MLR 359, 363. Another who 
expressed a preference for specific limited amendment rather than codification was FJ 
Odgers, ‘Occupiers’ liability: a further comment’ [1957] CLJ 39. 
187 Ibid, p.372. 
188 (1956-58) 12 NILQ 203; a comment in the Occupiers’ Liability Act (Northern Ireland) 
1957, which was based on the 1957 Act. 
189 For example, he regarded the use of examples as a ‘distinct novelty’ and ‘not a good 
precedent’ as the courts might use the examples to limit the general words by reference 
to the examples:  p 210.  Section 2(4) contained ‘more concealed traps than any 
licensee was ever called upon to face’: p 211.  The operation of the words ‘without more’ 
in s 2(4)(a) and (b) was unclear. 
190 See Carnwath LJ (a former Law Commissioner expressing enthusiasm for such 
reforms) in Maguire v Sefton Metropolitan Borough Council [2006] EWCA Civ 316, 
[2006] 1 WLR 2550 at para [33]:‘The Act has given rise to relatively little contentious 
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that have been settled include whether s 2(1) enables an occupier to exclude liability 
under the Act by putting up a notice and taking reasonable steps to draw it to the 
attention of the visitor;192 whether a person exercising a right of way is a visitor;193 and 
whether an implied term in a contract can impose a higher duty to a contracted entrant 
than the common duty of care.194  There has been clarification of the common law 
concept of ‘occupier’.195  Other cases have simply provided examples of recurring 
situations that can constitute a breach of the common duty of care.196  There seem to 
have been no calls for reform of any aspect of the 1957 Act; s 4 was not replaced 
because it was inherently unsatisfactory, but simply because it was superseded by a 
broader provision.  Overall, the 1957 Act must be accounted a success. 
 
Two points in conclusion.  First it would indeed be open to a defendant to argue that, on 
a particular set of facts, less is required by reasonableness as to the affirmative steps 
needed where the entrant is a bare licensee as opposed to someone with a material 
interest.  Such argument does not seem to have been presented. 
 
                                                                                                                                   
case law, and, when problems have arisen, it has provided a clear and reliable 
framework for resolving them.’ 
191 nn 291-320. 
192 Yes.  White v Blackmore [1972] 2 QB 651; Ashdown v Samuel Williams & Sons 
[1957] 1 QB 409 (decided at common law);  Ashdown was widely criticised essentially 
that on the basis that such notices are inherently objectionable rather than that they 
were specifically inappropriate in the context of occupiers’ liability:  see LCB Gower, 
(1950) 19 MLR, at 532-537;  FJ Odgers, [1957] CLJ 42-49; (1956) 72 LQR 71; D Payne 
(1958) 21 MLR at 364-365.  Such exclusions are now subject to the Unfair Contract 
Terms Act 1977.  
193 No:  Greenhalgh v British Railways Board [1969] 2 QB 286 (public right of way); 
Holden v White [1982] 2 QB 679 (private right of way). 
194 No:  Maguire v Sefton Metropolitan Borough Council [2006] EWCA Civ 316, [2006] 1 
WLR 2550. 
195 White v E Lacon & Co Ltd [1966] AC 552, ‘per Lord Denning at 578:  ‘wherever a 
person has a sufficient degree of control over premises that he ought to realise that any 
failure on his part to use care may result in injury to a person coming lawfully there, 
then he is an “occupier”….’  
196 eg the lack of an appropriate inspection regime: Tedstone v Bourne Leisure Ltd 
[2008] EWCA Civ 654; Hall v Holker Estate Co Ltd [2008] EWCA Civ 1422;  lack of care 
in the selection of an independent contractor;  Bottomley v Todmorden Cricket Club 
[2003] EWCA Civ 1575. 
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Secondly, it is anomalous that a different standard, the ‘measured duty of care’ is 
applicable to the liability of an occupier to a neighbour for a nuisance created by  
nature197 or a licensee198 (or presumably a trespasser).199 The difference is that the 
‘measured duty of care’ enables the court to adopt a more subjective approach to the 
standard of care than normal, factoring in the resources available to the kind of 
defendant involved.200  Given that the difference in approach has not affected outcomes, 
the most appropriate solution to the anomaly might well be to extend the normal 
standard of care to the occupier’s liability in nuisance. 
 
V Liability to Trespassers after Addie v Dumbreck 
 
In the period after Addie v Dumbreck was decided there were voices affirming that the 
‘humanitarian’ view that would impose on a landowner a duty to protect a child who is 
allowed or tempted to enter should be resisted,  Addie correctly stating the law.201  
However, there were also voices expressing dissatisfaction.202  Most outspoken was Lord 
Denning MR.  In Videan v British Transport Commission203 boy of 2, the son of a 
stationmaster who lived at a station, strayed onto the line and was seriously injured by a 
powerdriven trolley on the line.  The driver had driven fast, failed to keep a proper look-
out and had not braked hard enough soon enough.  Lord Denning MR regarded the Addie 
rule as fair as regards burglars and poachers, but as working most unfairly for 
trespassers ‘innocent of any wicked intent’ such as a child or an adult who had lost his or 
her way.  The harshness of the rule was to be mitigated in the case of an occupier’s 
                                           
197 Goldman v Hargrave [1967] 1 AC 645; Leakey v National Trust [1980] AC 485. 
198 Lippiatt v South Gloucestershire Council [2000] QB 51. 
199 Cf Sedleigh-Denfield v O’Callaghan [1940] AC 880. 
200 Goldman; Leakey. 
201 Scrutton LJ in Liddle v Yorkshire (North Riding) County Council [1934] 2 KB 101, 110-
111, expressing agreement with WTS Stallybrass, Salmond on Torts, 7th edn (London, 
Sweet & Maxwell, 1928) at p 472. 
202 eg Scott LJ (dissenting) in Adams v Naylor [1944] KB 750, 757-758:  ‘I do not see 
why [an occupier] should not be called on to take all reasonable precautions to keep 
children out of a place where he knows they will be blown up.’ 
203 [1963] 2 QB 650, generally endorsed by AL Goodhart, (1963) 79 LQR 586. 
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activities on land by the simple device of applying Donoghue v Stevenson instead.204  On 
the facts, however, the presence of the child trespasser was not reasonably foreseeable.  
This approach was, however, firmly rejected by the Privy Council in Commissioner for 
Railways v Quinlan.205  The judgment, given by Viscount Radcliffe, was largely based on 
a full analysis of the precedents, which clearly demonstrated that Addie had consistently 
and authoritatively been regarded as applying to activities and that Donoghue v 
Stevenson could not be interpreted as intended to qualify the established law on 
occupier’s liability.206  The only concession to the interests of trespassers was the 
proposition that the Addie formula  
 
 may embrace an extensive and, it may be, an expanding interpretation of what 
 is wanton or reckless conduct.207 
 
The only substantive justification for the law given was that 
 
 to accept the proposition that a trespasser who insists on forcing himself on to 
 the occupier’s premises and lets him know that he intends to enter in this way 
 can impose upon the latter, against his will, a duty to take precautions and have 
 care which may seriously impede the conduct of his lawful activities.208 
 
                                           
204 pp 662-668.  ‘Activities’ would include operating a moving staircase or digging a hole 
on land:  p 668.  Lord Denning traced this approach to his own opinion in Miller v South 
of Scotland Electricity Board 1958 SC (HL) 20, 37.  Harman LJ (at 673) agreed with Lord 
Denning’s distinction.  Pearson LJ’s view (at 676-682) was that a (lesser) duty of 
common humanity would be owed where the presence of a trespasser was reasonably 
foreseeable. 
205 [1964] AC 1054, reversing a decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales.  See 
AL Goodhart, (1964) 80 LQR 559, criticising the ‘confused state’ of the law. 
206 As evidently accepted by Lord Atkin himself in Hilden and Pettigrew v ICI (Alkali) Ltd 
[1936] AC 65, 70. 
207 Viscount Radcliffe at 1084. 
208 Viscount Radcliffe at 1086.  See also p 1085.  A slightly more extended explanation of 
the point was subsequently given by Lord Gardiner LC in Commissioner for Railways v 
McDermott [1967] AC 169, 190. 
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The contrast between the attention devoted to the precedents and to the underlying 
policy tells its own story.  It reaffirmed that absent a new power to overrule or statutory 
intervention, Addie was set in stone, with very limited room for manoeuvre. 
 
VI British Railways Board v Herrington 
 
The Practice Statement (Judicial Precedent),209  by which the Law Lords declared that in 
future the House would in appropriate circumstances be prepared to depart from its own 
previous decisions, paved the way for the decision in British Railways Board v 
Herrington.210  Peter Thomas Herrington, a boy of 6, was injured on June 7, 1965, by 
contact with a live rail on the defendants’ railway line.  He had trespassed over a fence 
at a point where it had, for several months, been broken down.  The defendants’ station 
master responsible for that stretch of line had been informed in April 1965 that children 
had been seen on it.  The fence had not been repaired.  As Lord Diplock noted in the 
House of Lords211 all nine judges who heard the case were convinced that it should 
succeed.212 In the House of Lords, all were agreed that liability should be found; that this 
could not be based on there being a duty of care under Donoghue v Stevenson;213 and 
that liability on these facts could not be based on Addie v Dumbreck.214 There was some 
coyness as to whether Addie needed formally to be overruled.215  Where there were 
differences in the five extended speeches was in the formulation of the conditions under 
which the new duty would arise and of its scope.  A number of the Law Lords explained 
                                           
209 [1966] 1 WLR 1234. 
210 [1972] AC 877. 
211 [1972] AC at p.931. 
212 Cairns J, following Videan, held the defendants liable for negligence; the Court of 
Appeal ([1971] 2 QB 107) held that the defendants had been reckless. 
213 The approach in Videan was expressly rejected:  see eg Lord Diplock at 942-943. 
214 See eg Lord Reid at 897-898. 
215 Yes:  Lord Reid at 897-898 (at least by necessary implication);  Lord Morris of Borth-
y-Gest at 911;  Lord Pearson at 930 (the Addie formulation ‘should be discarded’).  Lord 
Diplock (at 935) thought the point did not matter. Lord Wilberforce (at 917) seemed to 
accept Addie as the general rule, with room in specific circumstances for a special duty 
of care. 
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the duty as one of humanity rather than care216 and stated that it was to an extent 
subjective in that account could be taken of the resources available to the occupier.217 
Lord Diplock stated218 (broadly speaking) that no duty could arise until the occupier 
actually knows of physical facts which a reasonable person would appreciate would 
involve a danger of serious injury to the trespasser and showed that the trespasser’s 
presence was so likely that in all the circumstances it would be inhumane not to take 
steps (normally an effective warning) to mitigate the risk of injury.  The other judges 
were less precise.219 It was noted that there would no longer be ‘any need to strive to 
imply a fictitious licence’.220 There was also some discussion of the position of  
independent contractors on land.  Lords Wilberforce and Pearson suggested that they 
might now owe the same duty as the occupier,221 while Lord Diplock left the point 
open.222 
 
Academic response to the decision in Herrington was muted.  While the outcome seemed 
to be approved, the variety of formulations was noted and it was thought regrettable 
that the standard of conduct demanded was ‘not expressed in terms of the familiar 
requirement of acting with reasonable care.’223 Judicial responses were more positive, 
Lord Denning MR in particular seizing on the uncertainties in formulation to say that in 
considering when a duty arises 
                                           
216 Lord Reid at 898-899;Lord Morris at 906-907, 909 (‘common sense and common 
humanity’); Lord Pearson at 923 (‘ordinary humanity’). 
217 Lord Reid at 899 (‘knowledge, ability and resources’); Lord Wilberforce at 920 citing 
Goldman v Hargrave [1967] 1 AC 645, 663; Lord Diplock at 942. 
218 At 939-942.  A more detailed summary is at 941-942. 
219 Lord Reid (at 899) gave an example (inhumane not to take effective action at small 
trouble an expense where occupier knows of a substantial probability that trespassers 
would come); Lord Morris avoided generalisations;  Lord Wilberforce (at 920) focussed 
particularly on the lethal dangers arising from electrical conductors near to the public, 
which dangers were not apparent to children; Lord Pearson (at 922-923) stated that if 
the presence of the trespasser is known to or reasonably to be anticipated by the 
occupier, then there is a duty to act with ordinary humanity. 
220 Lord Reid at 899; Lord Diplock at 934. It is submitted that this does not mean that a 
licence can never properly be inferred from acquiescence. 
221 [1972] AC at 914, 929. 
222 At 943. 
223 CJ Miller, ‘Acting with common humanity’ (1972) 35 MLR 409, 413.  See also AL 
Goodhart, (1972) 88 LQR 305, 310-314, arguing that it would have been better for there 
to have been a single judgment or a statute. 
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the long and the short of it is that you have to take into account all the 
circumstances of the case and see then whether the occupier ought to have done 
more than he did.   
The duty was 
a duty to take such steps as ‘common sense or common humanity’ or whatsoever 
you like to call it would dictate for the safety of children who might trespass on 
the site.224 
 
VII Involvement of the Law Commission 
On 12 May 1971, Karl Newman of the Lord Chancellor’s Office wrote to JM Cartwright 
Sharp, Secretary to the Law Commission, to say that the Lord Chancellor, Lord Hailsham 
of St Marylebone, had read a note by AL Goodhart in the Law Quarterly Review225 
welcoming the decision of the Court of Appeal in Herrington.226  Lord Hailsham’s view 
tended to be that while Addie could be used as a good guide in respect of trespassers 
unknown to the occupier, his father227 never really explored the view that there might be 
a duty to fence against children foreseeably present on neighbouring land, at least where 
the danger is not otherwise avoidable should they enter on the land as trespassers.  It 
was suggested that the matter be brought to the attention of the Chairman of the Law 
Commission.228  Sharp replied229 ‘You are pushing at an open door.’  If the proposed 
appeal to the House of Lords did not go ahead, they wished to ask the Lord Chancellor to 
refer the topic for advice under s. 3(1)(e) of the Law Commission Act 1965.  They had 
already had occasion to give a good deal of thought to the subject in connection with 
                                           
224 Pannett v P McGuinness & Co Ltd [1972] 2 QB 599, 607.  This concerned a child who 
entered an unguarded building site where fires had been lit; the defendants were held 
liable.  See AL Goodhart, (1972) 88 LQR 457.  Other cases applying Herrington included 
Westwood v The Post Office [1973] 1 QB 591, CA; Penny v Northampton Borough 
Council (1974) 72 LGR 733; Harris v Birkenhead Corporation [1976] 1 WLR 279. 
225 AL Goodhart, ‘Occupiers’ Liability towards trespassers’ (1971) 87 LQR 168.  Goodhart 
suggested the area should be referred to the Law Commission. 
226 See above, n 210. 
227 Lord Hailsham LC, who participated in the decision in Addie. 
228 Material on Occupier’s Liability Towards Trespassers is found in Law Commission File 
127/130/01. 
229 14 May 1971.  Sharp to Newman. 
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their projects on Animals and Defective Premises.230  In the event, a reference was made 
on 21 April 1972, after the decision in the House of Lords in Herrington.231 The Law 
Commission published a Working Paper on 6 July 1973.232  This criticised the variations 
in formulation in the different speeches in Herrington and concluded that the law was 
unsatisfactory and that statutory intervention was desirable.  They proposed two models 
for consultation: A amending the Occupiers’ Liability Act 1957 to extend the common 
duty of care to trespassers, with or without additional guidelines; B to add to the 1957 
Act three provisions to the effect that the mere relationship of occupier and trespasser 
does not itself give rise to a duty of care; that an occupier owes a duty of care to any 
trespasser whom he ought as a reasonable man to have in contemplation as likely to be 
affected by his acts or omissions; and that the determination whether there is in the 
particular case a duty of care is a matter of law to be decided by the court.  A provisional 
preference was expressed for A.  Comments were also sought on the suggestion that the 
duty would cover damage to property; that there should be no absolute ban on 
exemption conditions, but that such conditions in tickets and similar documents of 
admissions should be banned in relation to death and personal injury and a 
reasonableness test applied in other cases; and that the defence of assumption of risk 
should be abolished in relation to occupiers’ liability.233 Features of the approach of the 
Law Commission that went beyond the methodology of the Law Reform Committee 
included an extensive consideration of the position in other common law systems234 and 
an interest in empirical evidence on accidents suffered by trespassers.235 However, 
neither proved particularly helpful.   
 
                                           
230 See Law Commission, Civil Liability for Animals (Law Com No 13, 1967) and Civil 
Liability of Vendors and Lessors for Defective Premises (Law Com No. 40, 1970).  Little 
mention is made of this matter in the Final Reports. 
231 Letter from Sharp to H. Boggis-Rolphe of the Lord Chancellor’s Office, 3 May 1972. 
232 Law Commission Working Paper No 52, Liability for damage or injury to trespassers 
and related questions of occupiers’ liability (HMSO).  
233 Paras 41-66. 
234 Appendix 2. 
235 Para 12.  In the event the only evidence it was possible to obtain concerned injuries 
to trespassers on railway property: Appendix 3. 
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The consultation process ‘evoked a very wide and diverse response,’236 including some 
who thought no reform was needed.  Notwithstanding some criticisms, the Law 
Commission remained of the view that the initial imposition of a general duty of care 
towards a trespasser remained the preferable course, but modified the form of the 
recommendations.  It accepted that, as the common duty of care under the 1957 Act 
was defined by reference to the purposes for which the visitor was invited or permitted 
to be on the premises, it was not appropriate to effect the reform by amending 1957 Act.  
It also took account of objections that it was not appropriate to impose a general duty of 
care which would require an occupier to make premises safe for persons whom they do 
not desire to be there.237   Accordingly, it proposed that there should be separate 
legislation under which an occupier would owe a duty to an invited entrant if, but only if, 
the danger was one against which, in all the circumstances of the case, the occupier 
could reasonably be expected to offer him some protection.  The duty would be one to 
take such care as was reasonable in all the circumstances of the case to see that the 
entrant did not suffer personal injury or death by reason of the danger.  The defence of 
volenti would be available and it would be possible for the occupier to exclude liability by 
a notice provided reasonable steps had been taken to draw it to the attention of the 
entrant.238  It would not be appropriate to take account of the occupier’s particular 
resources.239 Contract terms and notices purporting to exclude or restrict liability under 
the 1957 Act or the new Act would be ineffective if they were not fair and reasonable.240  
Lord Pearson, at that time Chair of the Royal Commission on Civil Liability and 
Compensation241 had written to Mr Rippengal,242 commenting on an internal draft of the 
final report, and expressing doubts as to the appropriateness of a general duty of care 
                                           
236 Law Commission, Report on Liability for damage or injury to trespassers and related 
questions of Occupiers’ Liability (Law Com No 75), para. 2. 
237 Paras 19, 20.  This was said not to be intention of the original proposals. 
238 Draft Bill, clause 2. 
239 Para. 29. 
240 Draft Bill, clause 3. 
241 Which eventually reported: Royal Commission on Civil Liability and Compensation for 
Personal Injury (London, HMSO, Cmnd 7054, 1978).  
242 A Parliamentary draftsman attached to the Law Commission. 
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that would be owed to every trespasser ‘however deliberate and criminal and evil-
minded the trespass might be’: 
Thus the turkey-stealer, which his charisma of criminality, a hero for the media, a 
darling of the Permissive Society, will get his charter and will triumph over the 
farmer, who merely produces food for the nation and does not normally commit 
newsworthy crimes.243 
The view of Norman Marsh, the responsible Law Commissioner, on this was that the 
matter would be dealt with at the breach stage, the duty being one to take ‘such steps 
(if any) as in all the circumstances of the case are reasonable.…’ The draft bill was 
redrafted in a way ‘less likely to give rise to Lord Pearson’s fears,’244 by distinguishing 
clearly between whether a duty is owed and the content of the duty.245 
 
The Lord Chancellor’s Office queried whether the Bill was sufficiently clear that the 
particular resources of the occupier would not be relevant,246 but was reassured247 that 
express provision on the point was both unnecessary248 and undesirable.249  In the event 
the Lord Chancellor sought and obtained policy approval for agreeing to the Law 
Commission’s recommendations.  The intention was to have the Bill taken up as a 
Private Member’s Bill.250  However this was subject to the need for further consideration 
of Clause 3 to ensure that an occupier’s duties could not be excluded by notice unless 
                                           
243 Letter from Lord Pearson to D Rippengal, 22 August 1975.  Lord Pearson accepted 
that this was not the intention of the Law Commission. 
244 Note by NSM, 24 November 1975. 
245 Note by D Rippengal, 21 November 1975.  Rippengal also had reservations on the 
policy of allowing exclusion of the duty by notice: ibid. 
246 LC File 127-130-01, Part 4.  Letter from MC Blair to JM Cartwright Sharp, 18 June 
1976. 
247 Letter from D Rippengal to MC Blair, 29 June 1976. 
248 ‘The duty is expressed as a duty of care’ and that the court would not look at D’s 
financial circumstances ‘can be regarded as axiomatic when one looks at the cases on 
negligence.’  
249 Because of the implication for other Acts imposing a duty of care and for the law of 
negligence generally.   
250 Memorandum by the Lord Chancellor to the Home and Social Affairs Committee of the 
Cabinet, 19 November 1976. 
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explicitly part of a contract.251  The Law Commission (informally) strongly resisted this 
suggestion.252  Those advising the Lord Chancellor were not persuaded.253 However, it 
was noted that while there was now a taker for the Bill 
I see little chance of the Bill getting through, because it is low on the list and will 
be strongly opposed by farmers and land-owners in both Houses….254 
A further difficulty was identified by P Graham-Harris when drafting Notes on Clauses for 
the Bill.  Clause 2 as drafted seemed to be limited to dangers arising from the state of 
the premises or from acts or omissions which render the premises unsafe; did this mean 
that the ‘activity duty’ would continue to be that of common humanity under 
Herrington?255 The view from the Law Commission was that if the position of the ‘activity 
duty’ after Herrington was not clear, the Bill should be clarified so that, where it had no 
operation, the common law of tort (trespass or negligence under Donoghue v Stevenson) 
would apply.256 Nevertheless, the policy subsequently agreed was that the Bill should 
cover all dangers to uninvited entrants, not just dangers due to the state of the premises 
or to things done or omitted to be done on them.  This would secure complete 
replacement of Herrington.  Other points included were that the duty would only be 
owed in respect of death or personal injuries; that the concept of ‘uninvited entrant’ 
would extend to include trespassers and persons entering land under an access 
agreement or order under the National Parks and Access to the Countryside Act 1949 or 
a private right of way; that the duty would not apply to persons using the highway; and 
that the volenti defence would be retained.  Clause 3 would reverse Ashdown v Samuel 
Williams & Sons Ltd.257 
                                           
251 This was the Attorney General’s view.  Draft letter for Lord Chancellor to send to the 
Attorney General, attached to letter from MC Blair to NS Marsh, 9 December 1976.  The 
draft letter expressed support from the Lord Chancellor for this view.   
252 Letter from NS Marsh to MC Blair, 13 December 1976, noting that such a change 
(reversing Ashdown v Samuel Williams) would lead to occupiers excluding non-paying 
entrants. 
253 Letter from JW Bourne (House of Lords) to NS Marsh, 11 January 1977. 
254 Ibid. 
255 Letter from P Graham-Harris to CW Dyment (Law Commission), 18 January 1977. 
256 Letter from CW Dymont to P Graham-Harris, 26 January 1977. 
257 Notes on Clauses on the Occupiers’ Liability Bill, enclosed with letter from MC Blair to 
JBK Rickford (Attorney General’s Chambers), 25 February 1977.  
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In the event the Bill258 was presented as a Private Member’s Bill but was objected to four 
times on Second Reading259 and was not debated.  Given the government’s insistence on 
including the clause reversing Ashdown v Samuel Williams, contrary to the Law 
Commission’s recommendation and without further public consultation, this is not 
surprising.260  It was hoped that the Bill would proceed in the 1977-78 session,261 but the 
private member willing to take it up was unsuccessful in the Ballot for Private Members’ 
Bills.  A further development was the approval of the Law Commission’s proposals by the 
Pearson Commission.262  No further attempt was then made to re-introduce the Bill.   
 
The story in the Law Commission files resumes in 1981, when it was reported that 
discussions involving the County Landowners’ Association, the National Farmers’ Union, 
the Central Council of Physical Recreation and the Lord Chancellor’s Office indicated that 
the prospects for legislation ‘may be rather better than they once were.’263 These 
organisations had come round to the view that a ‘statutory formulation of the duty would 
be preferable to the present uncertainty.’  Their main concern was now that the extent of 
a farmer’s liability to ramblers and climbers on their land was not clear if they were 
injured while pursuing their activities. Liability could not now be excluded because of the 
Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977. As a result the tendency was to restrict or prohibit 
access to land for leisure purposes.  They also felt strongly that under no circumstances 
                                           
258 1976-77 HC Bill 31. 
259 927 HC Deb 880, 4 March 1977; 927 HC Deb 1872, 11 March 1977; 928 HC Deb 869, 
18 March 1977; 928 HC Deb 1739, 25 March 1977.  The Bill was presented by Donald 
Anderson MP. 
260 It was subsequently said that failure was due in part to the lack of a provision 
excluding liability to criminal trespassers: LCD Note, n 264 below, p 3. 
261 A fresh draft Bill was prepared (3 November 1977).  It was envisaged that Clause 3 
would remain alongside the provisions of what would become the Unfair Contract Terms 
Act 1977. 
262 Royal Commission on Civil Liability and Compensation for Personal Injury (London, 
HMSO, Cmnd 7054, 1978), pp 321-325. The Royal Commission regarded this as an 
unsuitable area for either a no-fault scheme or strict liability: p 328.  
263 Letter from MD Huebner (Lord Chancellor’s Office) to RH Streeten (Law Commission), 
13 May 1981. 
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should there be any liability to criminal trespassers, something that might be possible 
under Herrington.  Discussions continued into 1982.264    
An amendment to the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 to disapply s 2 of that Act in 
respect of entry to or presence on land for recreational purposes was proposed by Lord 
Stanley in proceedings on the Administration of Justice Bill 1982.265  The Lord 
Chancellor, Lord Hailsham of St Marylebone, stated that he had consulted a range of 
bodies on both this matter and enactment of the duty to trespassers, with a range of 
responses.  The amendment was withdrawn.266  It was subsequently suggested that a 
composite Bill covering these two matters might succeed.267 The Lord Chief Justice, Lord 
Lane, also proposed that the issue of the use of land for recreational purposes might 
best be addressed by amending s 1(3)(b) of the 1977 Act to enable the occupier to 
exclude liability where entry was unconnected with the business use of the premises, a 
proposal endorsed by the Lord Chancellor’s Department.268  It was subsequently 
suggested that the question of the exclusion of liability should be dealt with by 
amendment to the 1977 Act, including the addition of a reference to the duty established 
by the new Act in s 1(1), which sets out the duties whose exclusion is controlled by the 
Act.269  The Law Commission also argued that express provision should be made 
                                           
264 Letter from MD Huebner to CF Hart (DoE), 13 May 1981; CLA, NFU, CCPR, ‘Occupiers 
Liability: Joint Submission to Lord Chancellor’s Office’ (29 January 1981); ‘Occupier’s 
Liability and Access to the Countryside Note by the Lord Chancellor’s Department’, 
February 1982. 
265 429 HL Deb cc 1290-93, 6 May 1982. 
266 It had been agreed between the government and opposition that the Bill would not 
include controversial proposals. 
267 Letter from PKJ Thompson (Lord Chancellor’s Department) to PM North (Law 
Commissioner), 1 July 1982. 
268 Letter from MD Huebner to EJ Lindley (Department of Trade), 5 July 1982.  This also 
noted that there was general support for a statutory formulation of the duty to 
trespassers but that there were considerable practical difficulties in formulating a 
workable exclusion covering criminal trespassers.  The Law Commission thought the 
LCJ’s amendments too wide: Letter from PM North to PKJ Thompson, 2 August 1982. 
269 Letter from PM North to PKJ Thompson, 14 September 1982.  This would prevent the 
owner of business premises excluding the new duty to trespassers, although such an 
owner would be able to exclude liability to any entrant entering business premises 
exclusively for his own purposes and not in connection with any purposes (business or 
otherwise) of the occupier.   
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enabling an occupier to exclude liability to an uninvited entrant by notice.270  By 
November 1982, work on the Bill had been taken up by the Lord Chancellor’s 
Department, whose policy on exemption clauses was different from the Law 
Commission’s position, being ‘one permitting the occupier wide freedom to exempt 
himself from liability both to trespassers and to those lawful visitors to his premises for 
their own, rather than his, purposes.’271   
 
In 1983, a revised Occupiers’ Liability Bill was drafted for the Lord Chancellor’s 
Department.  In this new version there were  
two significant omissions.  First we have given up any attempt to make the 
exclusion of liability to trespassers etc subject to control by the Unfair Contract 
Terms Act.  Secondly, we have not attempted to give the occupier a right to 
restrict or exclude his liability to trespassers etc. by means of a notice.272 
These two points were connected.  The instructions to the draftsmen did not require 
inclusion of an express right to exclude liability,273 as policy approval had not been given 
for such a provision in the present Bill.274  Counsel was instructed that s.1(1) of the 
Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 should be amended to make express reference to the 
duty under the new Act if the existing definition of ‘negligence’ for the purposes of 
UCTA275 might not cover it.276  In response, the draftsman, Euan Sutherland, asked why 
an amendment to UCTA was necessary: 
If an occupier owes a duty to a trespasser he has in general no machinery for 
excluding it.  He will not have a contract with the trespasser (unless the 
trespasser came on the land as a visitor under an agreement and subsequently 
                                           
270 Ibid.  For some reason, now forgotten, this had been excluded from the 1976/77 and 
1977/78 drafts of the Bill. (The reason is presumably that it was then government policy 
to reverse Ashdown v Samuel Williams.)   
271 Memo by PM North to Law Commissioners, 24 November 1982. 
272 Letter from PKJ Thompson to PM North, 27 May 1983. 
273 As originally proposed in Clause 2(4) of the Law Commission Bill attached to Law Com 
No 75. 
274 ‘Occupiers’ Liability: Instructions for the drafting of a Bill’ (undated), para. 5. 
275 Defined as including ‘any common law duty to take reasonable care or exercise 
reasonable skill’: s. 1(1)(b). 
276 Instructions, para 5. 
 47 
became a trespasser) and a notice to the trespasser would not be effective to 
exclude liability because, as the trespasser is not supposed to be there at all, the 
notice cannot be said to govern the terms of his admission (cf. Ashdown v 
Williams.)277 
The force of this argument was accepted.278 Other points made by Sutherland that were 
reflected in the Bill ultimately enacted were, first, that the wording of the original Law 
Commission draft Bill providing that the new rules would apply in respect of ‘any danger 
due to the state of the premises or to things done or omitted to be done on them’ was 
sufficient to cover both the occupancy and activity duties, on the basis that there was a 
single occupier’s duty to trespassers and that that was the Herrington duty.  Secondly, 
redrafting the duty provisions so that a duty would only arise 
in relation to a person whom the occupier knows or has reasonable grounds to 
believe will come into the vicinity of the danger 
‘might go some way towards quieting the fears’ of the NFU, CLA and others.279  It was 
also subsequently agreed that the modification to UCTA would only operate in respect of 
persons entering land for recreational purposes.280   
 
The Occupiers’ Liability Bill proceeded through Parliament281 with some minor 
amendments.  The government resisted amendments designed to exclude criminal 
trespassers from the ambit of the duty and to provide for the purposes of UCTA that 
making a charge for entry did not necessarily make it one for the business purposes of 
                                           
277 Letter from E. Sutherland to PKJ Thompson, 9 May 1983.  Sutherland was also critical 
of the proposed amendment of UCTA s 1(3), reducing the scope of protection for 
entrants. 
278 Letter from PKJ Thompson to E Sutherland, 13 May 1983. 
279 Letter from E Sutherland to PKJ Thompson, 4 May 1983.  Thompson agreed, 
regarding the second suggestion as ‘most valuable’: Letter from PKJ Thompson to E 
Sutherland, 5 May 1983.  
280 Letter from PKJ Thompson to E Sutherland, 24 May 1983. 
281 443 HL Deb, 12 July 1983, cols 719-725, 735-744 (Second Reading); 444 HL Deb, 27 
October 1983, cols 367-378, 384-391 (Committee); 444 HL Deb, 8 November 1983, cols 
1696-708 (Report); 444 HL Deb, 17 November 1983, cols 1378-1380 (Third Reading); 
HC Standing Committee J, 2 February 1984; 54 HC Deb, 20 February 1984, cols 661-
670 (Third Reading).   
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the occupier (the NFU and similar bodies being particularly exercised by this point).  
Overall, the Bill was regarded as ‘modest and useful’.282 
 
IX The Occupiers’ Liability Act 1984 
The Act that ultimately emerged achieved the major intended purpose of providing a 
single formulation of the duty owed to entrants other than lawful visitors,283 and enabling 
occupiers to exclude a duty arising out of the state of the premises owed to persons who 
enter for recreational or educational purposes other than the business purposes of the 
occupier.284 Neither aspect seems to have given rise to difficulty.  It has been confirmed 
that the formulation that a duty to a non-visitor will only arise where the occupier has 
reasonable grounds to believe there is a danger and that the entrant may come into the 
vicinity of it imports a more restrictive test than simply asking whether the occupier 
knows or ought to know of the danger or presence.285 This must be right logically, but 
the difference is limited and arguably mainly presentational.  In practice, in the reported 
cases only one claimant seems to have successfully established a claim under the 1984 
Act.286  Some of the points on which a clear view was taken by those preparing the 1983 
Bill have in fact led to speculation and some litigation.  In particular, the 1984 Act has 
not been interpreted as covering both occupancy and activity, although the same 
outcome has been achieved through the curious device of reading the principles of the 
1984 as also stating the common law liability to a non-visitor for activities.287 There have 
                                           
282 John Morris MP, 54 HC Deb, 20 February 1984, col 670, agreeing with the Solicitor-
General on the point. 
283 s 1. 
284 s 2, amending the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977. See generally M Jones, ‘The 
Occupier’s Liability Act 1984’ (1984) 47 MLR 713. 
285 Swain v Puri [1996] PIQR P442. 
286 Young v Kent County Council [2005] EWHC 1342 (QB), criticised in Keown v Coventry 
Healthcare NHS Trust [2006] EWCA Civ 39, [2006] 1 WLR 953. The first reported case 
where an adult was awarded damages under the 1984 Act was the Court of Appeal 
decision in Tomlinson, subsequently reversed: n 310 below. 
287 Revill v Newbery [1996] QB 567, criticised by T Weir, [1996] CLJ 182, inter alia on 
the ground that the 1984 Act did apply. It can be argued in defence of the position taken 
by the draftsman that as Herrington made it clear that ordinary negligence principles do 
not apply as between occupier and trespasser, the common law applying differently 
because of that relationship, the wording s 1(1)(a) that the rules enacted by s 1 ‘have 
effect, in place of the rules of the common law, to determine…whether any duty is owed 
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been suggestions that the duty can be excluded by a notice on the basis that it would 
not be reasonable for the entrant to expect any protection where reasonable steps had 
been taken to bring such a notice to his or her attention.288  This is not an argument that 
appears to have occurred to the draftsman or the Lord Chancellor’s Department.  That of 
itself is of course not decisive, but the background does show that the decision not to 
amend UCTA was based on the assumption that the duty could not in any event be 
excluded, the government having decided as a matter of policy not to agree with the 
Law Commission’s proposal that an express power to exclude be incorporated in the 
legislation. That did indeed leave as an anomaly the apparent position that while the 
duty to a trespasser cannot be excluded,289 a non-business occupier is able to exclude 
the duty under the 1957 Act in respect of a lawful visitor. One final point is that, while 
there is much to be said for the approach in the Occupiers’ Liability (Scotland) Act 1960, 
under which a single duty is owed to all entrants,290 and differences as to the kinds of 
entrant addressed as a matter of breach, it is clear that in the circumstances it would not 
have been practicable for that approach to law reform to have been adopted.      
 
X The scope of the Occupiers’ Liability Acts and the problem of ‘obvious risks’ 
The exact scope of the Occupiers’ Liability Acts has remained a matter of some difficulty.  
It is associated with the question of whether there is a proper basis for a distinction 
between ‘occupancy’ and ‘activity’ and if so whether that has survived the enactment of 
the two pieces of legislation.  As to the principles, it is submitted that this distinction is 
soundly based.  In the case of an activity that gives rise to a reasonably foreseeable risk 
of physical harm, a duty normally arises simply because the activity is undertaken,291 
and the normal standard of care one of reasonableness. Where occupiers drive their car 
                                                                                                                                   
by a person as occupier of premises to persons other than his visitors in respect of any 
risk of their suffering injury on the premises by reason of any danger due to the state of 
the premises or to things done or omitted to be done on them’ do naturally cover both 
activity and occupancy. 
288 See Clerk and Lindsell on Torts, 19th edn, para 12-74; M Jones, ‘The Occupier’s 
Liability Act 1984’ (1984) 47 MLR 713, 723-725. 
289 Apart from presumably by contract, which would not be subject to UCTA. 
290 An approach commended by Jones, op cit.  
291 Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562. 
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on their own land so as carelessly to injure a lawful visitor, it is clear that the duty of 
care arises in the defendant’s capacity as motorist and not as occupier.292  By contrast, 
where a lawful visitor is injured because of a defect in the state of the premises, then 
any duty in tort to take affirmative action can only be founded on the special relationship 
of occupier and visitor.  It is also clear that in the case of lawful visitors it has since the 
1957 Act made no substantive difference exactly where the line between occupancy and 
activity is drawn as the standard of liability is the same.  There leaves a technical 
question of whether the Act or the common law applies.  As regards liability to non-
visitors, the application of the normal negligence standard of liability to ‘activities’ would 
make the occupancy/activity distinction crucial.  For the moment at least, Revill v 
Newbury293 has put an end to that.  The point remains that the approach in some of the 
decisions on the distinction are not persuasive.  These tend to focus narrowly on the 
nature of the events that give rise to the injury rather than on the nature of the 
occupier’s responsibility for those events.  As the issue is the nature of any duty of care 
owed it is the latter that is in point.  Accordingly, where the occupier (or the occupier’s 
employee) negligently creates a risk that a visitor may reasonably foreseeably be 
physically injured, the common law should apply, whether the risk arises from a change 
to the physical state of the premises or from the activity of the occupier (or employee).  
Conversely, there are a number of situations where the occupier can only be held liable 
because of his or her status as an occupier, because the liability is essentially one for an 
omission.  These include: (1) where the risk arises from a natural deterioration in the 
state of the premises;294 (2) where the risk arises from an act of the occupier (or 
employee) that was not careless at the time it was done;295 (3) where the negligent act 
of a third party (not an employee of the occupier) creates a risk either in itself296 or by 
                                           
292 See eg Lord Gardiner LC in Commissioner for Railways v McDermott [1967] AC 169, 
186-7. 
293 Above n 287. 
294 eg stairs become rotten.  
295 eg a reclusive occupier digs a hole in the driveway to his house at a time when it is 
not reasonably foreseeable that anyone will use the driveway; the occupier decides he 
likes people after all and invites them to use his driveway. 
296 eg a visitor drives carelessly on the occupier’s driveway injuring another visitor.    
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changing the physical state of the premises.297 Where the occupier creates the risk there 
will be co-existent duties in that, apart from the initial liability, there will also be a duty 
to warn, both because he or she created the risk and because he or she is the occupier. 
 
It is submitted that an approach that focuses on the whether it is sought to hold the 
defendant liable for an act or an omission (in the sense of a failure to confer a benefit)298 
is preferable to the argument of Peter North299 that the crucial distinction is whether or 
not the risk arises from the ‘state of the structure or premises themselves’,300 given that 
the defendant’s responsibility arises from the control that can be exercised by him or her 
as occupier over both the premises themselves and what goes on on them.  North’s 
response is this:  
It is hard to see the logic in a situation where, if the occupier shoots a visitor, the 
case falls to be considered at common law, whereas if the occupier’s visitor 
shoots another visitor the liability falls to be determined under the Occupiers’ 
Liability.301 
It is submitted that this is not at all anomalous: it simply means that the 1957 Act 
applies where the responsibility of the defendant arises from his capacity as occupier. 
 
If this is right, then Lord Wright was correct in Glasgow Corporation v Muir 302to treat the 
liability of the defendants’ shop manageress arising from her decision to permit third 
parties to carry an urn of hot tea through a narrow space next to a sweet counter as 
arising from the invitor-invitee relationship.303 It also follows that Lord Keith in Ferguson 
                                           
297 eg visitor carelessly digs a hole in the occupier’s driveway.  
298 This argument was made by EC Harris in AM Linden (ed), Studies in Canadian Tort 
Law (Toronto, Butterworths, 1968), 250, 263, cited by North, op cit, at 86. See also FH 
Newark, (1954) 17 MLR 102, 109-110. 
299 Occupiers’ Liability (London, Butterworths, 1971), 71-87. 
300 p 86.  
301 North, op cit, at 87. 
302 [1943] AC 448, 462-463. 
303 The plaintiff was scalded when the urn was dropped.  Lord Romer (at 466) also 
expressly invoked the invitor-invitee relationship.  The majority spoke in terms of a 
general duty of care; as the plaintiff was an invitee, nothing turned on the difference in 
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v Welsh 304 was right to conclude that an occupier can in certain circumstances be liable 
to the employee of an independent contractor where the occupier knows or has reason 
to suspect that the latter is using an unsafe system of work.  On the other hand, Lord 
Goff305 drew an unhelpful and obscure distinction when he concluded that the plaintiff’s 
injury ‘arose not from his use of the premises but from the manner in which he carried 
out his work on the premises,’ and so the 1957 Act did not apply.  Mr Ferguson was 
standing on a wall which collapsed as a result of an unsafe system for demolition work 
adopted by his employers, who claimed to be sub-contractors of the defendant occupier.  
It is well established that an occupier can be liable to a visitor as occupier in respect of 
risks created by third parties.306  This is not, with respect, limited to special 
circumstances where they would be liable as a joint tortfeasor, which Lord Goff 
suggested was the only basis for liability in such circumstances.307  
 
It is curious that the Court of Appeal in Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd 308 
regarded Lord Goff’s interpretation of approach as correct, given that the majority clearly 
approached the case on the basis that the 1957 Act was in principle applicable although 
there was no liability on the facts.  It is submitted that the Court of Appeal in Fairchild 
wrongly concluded that the liability of an occupier in respect of an injury caused by the 
activity of a third party in dealing with asbestos arose only at common law.  They 
seemed to think that this was an application of the occupancy/activity distinction; 
overlooking the point that it was not the occupier’s activity that gave rise to the risk.309   
                                                                                                                                   
formulation.  The key point of the case is that the House unanimously found there to 
have been no breach of duty.   
304 [1987] 3 All ER 777, 783.  Lords Brandon and Griffiths agreed with Lord Keith.  It is 
submitted that Lord Oliver of Aylmerton’s view that the liability would be rather that of a 
joint tortfeasor than an occupier usually be the case; the liability would normally be for 
failing to prevent harm. 
305 [1987] 3 All ER, 777, 786. 
306 Cox v Coulson [1916] 2 KB 177; Glasgow Corporation v Muir, above. 
307 [1987] 3 All ER 777, 786.  Lord Oliver of Aylmerton (at 785) inclined to the same 
view on this point. 
308 [2002] 1 WLR 1052, paras [122]-[155].  
309 This point was also overlooked by Brooke LJ in Bottomley v Todmorden Cricket Club 
[2003] EWCA Civ 1575, where he attributed an occupiers’ liability for activities permitted 
or encouraged to the ‘activity duty’. 
 53 
 
This brings us to the leading modern case on the Occupiers’ Liability Acts, Tomlinson v 
Congleton Borough council,310 which raised a number of interesting points.  The 
defendant local authorities occupied a country park which included a lake that had 
formed in a disused quarry.  They posted notices that said ‘Dangerous water: no 
swimming’ and rangers gave warnings against swimming, but they were aware that 
many visitors entered the water and that there had been several accidents.  They 
decided to plant vegetation round the shore to prevent people going into the water, but 
did not have the financial resources to implement that decision by the time of the 
accident.  The plaintiff, aged 18, dived from a standing position in shallow water, struck 
his head on the sandy bottom and broke his neck.  The Court of Appeal311 by a majority 
found the defendant liable in respect of this injury, but this was reversed by the House of 
Lords.  The leading opinion was given by Lord Hoffmann.312 His Lordship held that it had 
rightly been conceded that the plaintiff was a trespasser when he dived into the water 
and so the question was whether there was any liability under the 1984 Act.313  
However, there was no ‘danger due to the state of the premises or to things done or 
omitted to be done on them’ and so the 1984 Act did not apply.314  On the facts, this was 
an ordinary stretch of open water, there were no hidden dangers and council was not 
doing or permitting anything to be done which created a danger, such as the use of 
power boats or jet skis.  The plaintiff’s misjudgement could not be attributed to the state 
                                           
310 [2003] UKHL 47, [2004] 1 AC 46. 
311 [2002] EWCA Civ 309, [2004] 1 AC 59. 
312 Lords Nicholls, Hobhouse and (subject to one reservation) Scott agreed with Lord 
Hoffmann. 
313 paras [6]-[16].  Lord Hobhouse thought it artificial to treat the plaintiff as a 
trespasser given that paddling was allowed and he was at the material time in water 
which only came a little above his knees, but concluded it made no difference: para [67].  
Lord Scott (paras [87]-[91]) thought the 1957 Act applied because the plaintiff had not 
been ‘swimming’. 
314 paras [26]-[29].  Lord Hutton inclined to the view that dark and murky water which 
prevented a person seeing the bottom of the lake where he was diving could be viewed 
as ‘the state of the premises’: para [53].  Lord Hobhouse thought it a ‘misuse of 
language’ to describe features such as steep slopes or cliffs close to cliff paths as the 
state of the premises: para [69].   
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of the premises; the only risk arose out of what he chose to do.  ‘Things done or omitted 
to be done’ 
means activities or the lack of precautions which cause risk, like allowing 
speedboats among the swimmers.315  
This analysis is, with respect, unconvincing.  It is clear that the affirmative duties of an 
occupier to a lawful visitor, based on the occupier’s control of the premises, is not 
confined to protecting careful entrants.  Accidents may well happen because of the 
combination of a danger arising from the state of the premises and the carelessness of 
the entrant.  An example would be an entrant who fails to keep a proper look out and 
trips in a small hole in the defendant’s driveway.  It cannot plausibly be argued that, as 
the hole would have been obvious if the claimant had only looked, there is no danger 
due to the state of the premises. Can it make a difference if the entrant sees the hole, 
but misjudges the change in stride pattern needed to avoid it? Surely not.   The 1984 
Act316 does not say that it only applies where state of the premises is the sole cause of 
the injury.  Accordingly, it is submitted that the Act can apply where the accident arises 
from the claimant’s misjudgement of the risks the premises pose.  A related point is that 
the Acts are not confined in terms to ‘hidden dangers’ (the other side of the coin to 
obvious risks).  To reintroduce such a concept as relevant to whether a duty arises as 
distinct from whether there is a breach of duty would seem to be raising the common 
law concept of a ‘concealed trap’ from its grave.  Where risks are obvious, it may well be 
difficult for the claimant to prove breach.  It may be that that fact would enable the 
defendant to show that the claimant’s act in running that risk was a new intervening 
cause or gave rise to the defence of voluntary assumption by risk.317  It is unduly 
restrictive to hold that no duty can ever arise in these circumstances.   
 
                                           
315 para [28]. 
316 The 1957 Act is identically worded in this point. 
317 Preserved in both the 1957 and 1984 Acts. See eg Ratcliff v McConnell [1999] 1 WLR 
670. 
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On the contrary assumption that the 1984 Act did apply, Lord Hoffmann proceeded to 
hold318 that the defendants had knowledge or foresight of the danger (albeit that the 
chances of such an accident were small) and of the presence of the trespasser and so s 
1(1)(a) and (b) of the 1984 Act were satisfied.  He held, robustly, that in deciding what 
steps it was reasonable to expect of the defendants (under either the 1957 Act or the 
1984 Act) it was proper to take account of the social value of the activities to be 
prohibited and the point that it should be extremely rare for an occupier to be under a 
duty to prevent people from taking risks which are inherent in the activities they freely 
choose to undertake upon the land.319 On the facts here, the defendants were not 
required to take any steps to protect the plaintiff from dangers that were perfectly 
obvious. It is submitted that the appeal was rightly allowed for these reasons.320 
 
While the outcome is right, it is to be regretted that Tomlinson creates a risk that the 
balance between occupier and visitor (lawful or otherwise) enshrined in the legislation 
has been tilted too far back in favour of the occupier by glosses as to the nature of the 
duty that reflect considerations properly relevant to breach.   
 
XI Conclusion 
The history of the law of occupiers’ liability provides a number of lessons concerning the 
respective merits of developing the common law through judicial decisions and through 
statute.  The problems that emerged with the common law can be traced to a number of 
factors.  First, the structure of the law became established in the nineteenth century 
when the prevailing mode of legal argument involved a focus on the outcomes of 
previous cases and their facts rather than on underlying principles of law and the 
purposes that those principles night be thought to serve.  This structure ultimately 
                                           
318 paras [32]-[50].  Lord Hutton agreed that the risk was not one against which the 
defendant might reasonably have been expected to offer the plaintiff some protection: 
paras [56]-[65].  
319 para. [45]. 
320 See J Morgan, ‘Tort, insurance and incoherence’ (2004) 67 MLR 384, welcoming the 
decision. 
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proved unsustainable: distinctions that made sense when considering the obvious 
examples that illustrated each category came to look arbitrary when (many) borderline 
cases came to be litigated.  Secondly, the structure became regarded as entrenched, not 
least by decisions of the House of Lords, which up to 1966 could only be altered by 
statute.  As was to be expected, there were recurring situations where at least some 
judges took the view that the strict rules operated harshly.  They could not change the 
law and so the only way they could secure a just outcome was by adopting a strained 
interpretation of the facts, or simply asserting that the law was different from what it 
was generally accepted to be.321 Such an approach leads to inconsistencies.  Thirdly, the 
law on particular substantive points where the judges did have a choice arguably took a 
wrong turn.322 A number were controversial to some contemporary eyes.  
 
The common law of occupiers’ liability illustrates the desirability of developing principles 
whose purposes are fully analysed and understood.  It illustrates the undesirability of an 
excessive focus on the facts of cases and how they compare with the precedents; of the 
use of catchphrases (such as ‘trap’) which begin to have a life of their own; of excessive 
complication in the law (with many distinctions to be litigated); of a rule that the highest 
court in the legal system is bound by its own previous decisions (a number of the 
decisions in the House of Lords in this area being among the least distinguished of that 
body); and of an approach to decision making in the final appellate court that can lead to 
a plurality of opinions expressed with variations of language that leave it unclear 
whether there are differences of view as to the substance of the law.  Herrington is also 
open to the further criticism that too much the opinions was focussed on justifying an 
outcome in favour of the plaintiff rather than on articulating principles to guide future 
courts.  Two final aspects of the common law of tort illustrated by the history of the 
common law of occupiers’ liability have been, first, the point that insufficient attention 
                                           
321 A tactic employed from time to time by Lord Denning.  See eg. Wheat v E Lacon & Co 
Ltd [1966] AC 552, 578 (dictum that the common law obligation of the occupier had 
become merely a duty of reasonable care whether arising out of occupancy or activity) 
322 eg Fairman (n 79); Horton (n 112). 
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has been paid to the distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance and second, the 
absence of a fully worked-out concept of recklessness, which might have provided a 
suitable halfway house between carelessness and wilful wrongdoing for some categories 
of case.   
 
The intervention of statute has been largely successful.323  Indeed the 1957 Act has 
served as a model for other common law jurisdictions.324  However, the structure of the 
law that has emerged is one which could have been produced by a final appellate court 
freed of the shackles of precedent and less inhibited from being seen in effect to legislate 
than the House in Herrington.  The history of the enactment of the 1984 Act also 
illustrates the difficulty for a law reform body in securing the passage of legislation that 
arouses (at least some) popular controversy.  Seeking reform via a Private Member’s Bill 
failed, it can be inferred, as a result of pressure from interest groups representing 
landowners.  The changes were only effected when the government came to be in a 
position to do a deal with (amongst others) the landowners groups, and was able to find 
time for a government bill.   
 
Overall, the two Bills can be seen to have enacted principles on the pattern of the 
common law.  It may be that in future such legislation will not be needed as such 
reforms can be secured by a confident and effective Supreme Court, uninfluenced by 
pressure groups.   
 
                                           
323 Issues not resolved include whether the Herrington standard should be regarded as 
non excludable under the Ashdown v Samuel Williams doctrine as regards lawful visitors 
and employed as the standard of liability of occupiers in respect of entrants using a 
public right of way over their land not maintainable at the public expense: see RA 
Buckley, The Law of Negligence, 4th edn (London, LexisNexis Butterworths, 2005), paras 
10.60-10.62.  More recent amendments have been made in consequence of the 
introduction of the ‘right to roam’ by the Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000 
(amendments to the 1984 Act inserting s 1(6A)-(6C) and s 1A) and to s 1(4) of the 1957 
Act (persons exercising the right are owed a modified duty under the 1984 Act) 
324 See eg. S Todd, The Law of Torts in New Zealand (5th edn, Wellington, Brookers, 
2009), Ch 6.2 (Occupiers’ Liability Act 1962); P HandforD, ‘Occupiers’ liability reform in 
Western Australia – and elsewhere’ (1987) 17 U W Austl L Rev 182.  
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